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1. Introduction
1.1 Setting the Scene 
At the end of the Cold War, there was a proliferation of intrastate conflicts, as opposed to 
the previously predominant interstate conflicts.1 Elections were viewed  as a panacea for 
the ills developed during a country’s internal conflict2 because elections in “themselves 
can build capacity to deal with conflicts peacefully.”3 The core premise of this logic is that 
“peace will be secured by an election because the winner will be recognized as legitimate 
by the population, making violent opposition more difficult.”4 Some examples seemed to 
confirm this notion. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was during the nineties 
often described as the ‘oasis of peace’ in the otherwise turbulent Balkans. Then, a conflict 
erupted, which after thirteen months of violence ended in the Ohrid peace accord of 
August 2001. "There will be more hard work ahead and many more challenges, but these 
elections are a decisive step in the right direction and a clear rejection of the violence 
which tarnished the last months," said NATO secretary general George Robertson 
following the country’s first post-conflict elections in 2002.5 The elections marked a 
decisive step towards war termination in Macedonia and the country’s rejection of 
violence. Peace was consolidated to such a great extent that at the end of 2005 
Macedonia was granted candidate status to the European Union.6  
A similar course of events was expected in December 2004, when in Côte d’Ivoire the 
rebel group New Forces signed a comprehensive peace agreement with the declared goal 
of “peace born from free, fair and open elections.”7 These elections, held six years later, 
turned out to be brutal and violent, leading the renowned conflict resolution, non-
governmental organisation International Crisis Group (ICG) to release a publication in 
March the following year entitled “Côte d’Ivoire: Is War the Only Option?”.8  
Côte d’Ivoire was not an exception to the rule. In, amongst others, Nigeria (2011), the 
Philippines (2007), the DRC (2006), Uganda (2006), Congo-Brazzaville (2002), Angola 
1 Themnér and Wallensteen (2012). 
2 For a general overview of the discourse see Diamond and Plattner (1996). 
3 Höglund (2009): p. 533 
4 Collier (2009): p.80 
5 Petruseva (2002) http://iwpr.net/report-news/elections-huge-victory-macedonia, last accessed 25.01.2013. 
6 European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-
information/fyrom/index_en.htm, last accessed 25.01.2013. 
7 Rothchild (2005): p.254.  
8 International Crisis Group (2011). 
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(1992), and Kyrgyzstan (1990), elections that had been expected to confirm war 
termination triggered new conflicts in themselves. Despite this, there is of course no iron 
law which dictates that elections in post-conflict societies are doomed to fail, as evidence 
from the first example of Macedonia (2002), as well as Nepal (2008), Sierra Leone (2002) 
El Salvador (1994), Mozambique (1994) and South Africa (1994), show.9  
Nevertheless we cannot deny that it appears that “elections held in the shadow of war 
sometimes generate more violence in already war-torn societies.”10 In light of a growing 
number of examples where elections, the cornerstone of democracy, did not fulfil their 
alleged promise of resolving conflicts using ballots rather than bullets, concerns mounted 
as to whether the so-called developing world was in fact ‘ready’ for democracy. Robert 
Kaplan, the controversial journalist and academic, thus asserts that a myriad of cultural 
and economic factors make the societies of Eastern Europe, the Arab World and Africa 
essentially unfit for democracy. “In a society that has not reached the level of 
development Toqueville described, a multi-party system merely hardens and 
institutionalizes established ethnic and regional divisions”11 and democracy thus becomes 
a fraud12: it becomes democrazy.13   
1.2 Research Question 
In light of this potential gap between normative appeal and the empirical evidence14, the 
question I would like to address is  
Why are post-conflict elections, following the termination of a conflict through a 
comprehensive peace agreement (CPA), successful in preventing the recurrence of 
conflict in some cases, but not in others? 
9 Adapted from Kühne (2010). 
10 Jarstad (2009): p.49.  
11 Kaplan (2003): http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1997/12/was-democracy-just-a-
moment/306022/, last accessed 20.01.2013. 
12 Kaplan (1997): http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1997/12/was-democracy-just-a-
moment/306022/, last accessed 15.01.2013.  
13 When elections become a matter of life and death, and no longer simply a means to determine who 
governs, is what Paul Collier termed democrazy. Refer to Collier (2009): p.15. 
14 Pointed out by Flores and Nooruddin (2012): 558. 
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1.3 Peace through Democracy? 
Elections have increasingly been attributed a dual role in post-conflict settings, namely 
war termination and democratisation.15 Elections are thereby regarded as means to 
demilitarize politics, leading to democratisation. I am first and foremost interested in the 
role of elections in war termination, since I focus on the ‘success’ of an election in 
preventing the recurrence of conflict in post-conflict countries where the conflict was 
terminated by the signing of a CPA.  
To differentiate between the role of elections in war termination and democratisation is 
important.  The success of elections in marking the beginning of politics dominated by 
ballots rather than bullets does not guarantee success with regards to democratisation.16 I 
will therefore not investigate the long-term benefits of elections for democratisation as 
part of this paper. Since my focus is on cases where a CPA was signed, I am also not 
concerned with the circumstances which enabled the conflict parties to strike a deal, since 
these differ from those related to implementation of provisions of the CPA and, ultimately, 
war termination.17 
Civil wars are often ‘seemingly intractable’, which explains the plethora of theories 
concerned with their origin as well as their resolution.18 This paper will build on what can 
be considered the two most dominant strands of theory: the ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ 
mobilisation debate. The ‘greed’ perspective, predominantly associated with the work of 
Paul Collier and his associates, essentially holds that economic agendas are the primary 
driving force behind internal conflict.19 The grievances approach, most prominently 
defended by Robert Gurr, conversely claims that repression and perceived or real 
disadvantage of one group leads to violent conflict.20 More recent findings, however, 
suggest that the distinction between the two lines of thought is not so clear cut. Frances 
Stewart found that the aspect of ‘greed’ plays less of a role in the decision to wage war 
when the disadvantaged group is included in the political process.21 This interlinked 
function of greed and grievance when violence is perceived as rational is what my model, 
subsequently introduced in Chapter 3, is built on.22 The task is, to manage the legacies of 
15 Garber (1998): p.5; Lyons (2002); Leonard (2011).   
16 Reilly (2008): p.159. 
17 Pointed out by Walter (2002): p.14. 
18 The Balkan Wars were particularly in their early stages characterised by reference to the ‘intractable’ nature 
of the conflict, making intervention undesirable.  
19 E.g. Collier and Hoeffler (1998); Collier (2000). 
20 Gurr (1970). 
21 For a review of the debate refer to Keen (2012). 
22 Regarding a review of the literature which also adheres to this opinion refer to Keen (2012): p.771. 
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the conflict prior to the holding of the first post-conflict election in such a way that leaders 
will lay down their arms and the uncertainty of the electoral process can be overcome.23 
My paper combines elements of both rational choice theory and institutionalism. While 
actors (rebel groups and government) are rational and war recurrence should thus not be 
in their interest, their choices are constrained through incomplete information, making 
commitment to the peace process a complex task.24 In addition, the model introduced in 
this paper builds on the assumption that strategies of individuals are mutually dependent 
on expectations of how other individuals will behave. Since information is incomplete, this 
can lead to “self-fulfilling prophecies”, or security dilemmas, if there are no security 
inducing factors which help the actors to overcome their commitment problem.25  
In order to avoid the distortion of my results through interference of competing 
explanatory factors, two control variables are employed prior to case selection. Since the 
majority of literature on civil war recurrence focuses on factors affecting the conflict 
environment, I controlled for the degree of economic development (CV1), as indicated by 
Gross National Income (GNI) per capita and prior levels of democratic experience (CV2) 
as indicated by the Polity IV Index (Chapter 5.2). In addition, I have chosen the most 
similar cases which had the most extreme values on my independent variables, as this 
gives the strongest results when using congruence procedure as part of a positivist 
research design. 
In order to explain the phenomenon of recurring conflict following a national election 
(DV), I deduced from existing theory two explanatory variables which I posit to be the 
most decisive with regards to preparing the ground for peaceful elections, following the 
signing of a CPA. The period under examination is thus the ‘transitional phase’, the period 
after a CPA is signed and before a new, democratically elected government is 
inaugurated. I propose that we should pay particular attention to the role of external 
security guarantees (IV1) and to the inclusiveness of political institutions (IV2) in order to 
explain the phenomenon of the recurrence of conflict following a national election in post-
conflict countries.  
I argue that these two features, IV1 and IV2, reduce the stakes of the electoral process 
so that deciding who governs, essential for war termination, can be achieved without 
backsliding into conflict. IV1 provides a safe structural environment, whereby the 
                                          
23 Lyons (2002) equally points out the connection between conflict resolution and political transition concepts 
with an emphasis on the role of interim, or transitional, structures.  
24 Fearon (1995) gives a comprehensive account of this dynamic, specifically refering to ethnic groups.  
25 Also pointed out by Lindberg (2009): p.10. 
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international peace operation credibly guarantees the agents (the government and the 
rebels) that they will not tolerate any violation of the agreed upon rules, serving as a 
containment mechanism for potential spoilers.26 IV2 ensures that the institutional 
environment is inclusive which mitigates credible commitment problems and hence leaves 
no room for grievances. Both explanatory variables are designed to manage expectations 
which prevent actors committing to the peace process due to lack of trust. If expectations 
are not managed, the electoral process serves as a critical turning point towards a 
recurrence of conflict. This highlights that the effectiveness of elections for war 
termination depends on the context in which they are situated.27  
The findings from the comparative case studies (presented in Chapter 7) of Djibouti, 
Sierra Leone, Liberia and Burundi show that there is indeed a positive relationship with 
regards to my explanatory variables and the ‘success’ of elections in preventing a 
recurrence of conflict. That said, the two cases where neither of my explanatory factors 
was present, point to a slightly more complex picture. While one (Sierra Leone) slid back 
to war not even a year after the signing of the CPA, the other (Djibouti) was able to 
conduct peaceful elections despite the missing presence of factors I expected to be crucial 
in this. The paper nevertheless demonstrates that the experience of a political order 
where trust was rewarded and mechanisms for monitoring and punishment existed prior 
to the holding of elections is a contributing factor in breaking the cycle of violence.  
1.4 Relevance and Methodological Remarks 
While much has been written on the causes of intrastate conflict, there is far less on “the 
circumstances under which the self-renewing aspects of internal conflict become, or may 
become, muted.”28  This masters thesis hence aims to contribute to the still evolving 
peace-building literature, which focuses on war termination and the risk of war 
recurrence.29 Considering the threat posed by internal conflict to the international system, 
deducing factors which can reduce the risk of conflict recurrence is of great practical 
relevance. As early as the nineties the research gap was pointed out by Licklider, who 
attributes it to the lack of collaborative work between the separate disciplines of 
international politics (dealing with inter-state war), comparative politics (intra-state war 
                                          
26 For a detailed account on the dynamics of spoilers in peace processes, see Stedman (1997). 
27 The argument is in large parts based on the work of Collier (2009), Walter (2002), Paris (2004), Lyons 
(2002) and Shain and Linz (1995).  
28 Licklider (1993): p.7.  
29 Refer to Sambanis (2002) for a full review of trends in the study of civil war.  
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but without considering the existing literature on inter-state war) and history (working 
with non-transferable single case studies).30 This paper will employ a positivist design and 
conduct a small-N comparative case-study on basis of Most Similar System Design 
(MSSD). It thus departs from the predominantly employed large-N or single case study 
approach in order to investigate whether the apparent danger of elections in post-conflict 
settings can be mitigated. The focus is on internal conflicts ended through comprehensive 
peace agreements (CPA), as this has become the predominant end to internal conflicts 
since the end of the Cold War.31 My paper differs from other works on the subject of civil 
war recurrence following the holding of post-conflict elections in two important respects. 
Thanks to a newly released dataset, I was able to measure violence directly in relation to 
elections which allowed me to make a more differentiated assessment (Chapter 4.1) than 
previous studies which used a generalised threshold.32 Another important difference is 
that my IV2, inclusiveness of political institutions, assesses power-sharing pacts according 
to whether they were implemented33 and not only the provision made in the original 
peace accord, as was done in previous studies.34 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
In order to elucidate my question regarding the phenomenon of recurrence of conflict 
following the first post-conflict election, the next chapter will review the most pertinent 
theories on conflict recurrence. Following the evaluation, I will deduce which aspects of 
existing theories are of relevance to answer the question of this thesis. In order to 
understand the phenomenon of elections seemingly serving as a trigger for violence 
under certain circumstances, the subsequent chapter will consider the democracy-conflict 
nexus. The third chapter will in light of the previously outlined considerations introduce 
the model this paper is based on, in which the influence of my study variables on my 
dependent variable is presented. Subsequently I outline how my concepts can be 
operationalised to be fit for empirical comparison and I summarise my model and its 
predicted effects once more. The challenge of case selection according to the principles of 
MSSD and the inherent necessity of controlling for third variable influence are the subject 
                                          
30 Licklider (1993): p.6.  
31 Pointed out by Snyder and Brancati (2011a): p. 474; Collier (2009): p.3. 
32 For the National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) dataset, refer to Hyde and Marinov 
(2012). 
33 This was made possible through the new database Peace Accord Matrix (PAM), peaceaccords.nd.edu, last 
accessed 05.02.2013.  
34 E.g. Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) and (2005a); Cammett and Malesky (2012).  
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of the fifth chapter. From that follows the empirical test of the model on the basis of my 
case studies Djibouti, Sierra Leone, Burundi and Liberia in chapter six. The final chapter 
assesses the validity of my model with regards to my results. Lastly, some potential 
shortcomings of my work, as well as points for further research, are discussed.  
2. The Democracy-Conflict Nexus: A Commitment 
Problem? 
2.1 Forging Peace? Conflict Recurrence Revisited. 
In the following I will present a brief review of the origins of violent conflict. This overview 
can by no means be regarded as exhaustive.35 Explanations for the emergence of conflict 
are manifold. Large-N, quantitative studies solve the problem by merging all possible 
factors into a regression analysis while single case studies enlighten every single aspect 
but, "we need to bring knowledge together in reasonably compact form in order for that 
knowledge to serve a useful purpose.”36 Accordingly, I will only review the most pertinent 
factors focussing on conflict recurrence specifically. Explanations can roughly be divided 
into three camps which focus respectively on the question why did the original conflict 
start, how it was fought and how did it end.37 These explanations will be addressed in 
reverse order. Lastly, the chapter will argue that national attributes are the most 
important factors to consider, i.e. the reasons why the original conflict started, when 
examining the breakdown of peace in light of an election38, because they shape the 
political context in which post-conflict elections are set.39 Creating a context in which 
commitment becomes possible thereby plays a pivotal role in preventing the recurrence of 
conflict, as I will show in the model introduced in Chapter 3.  
Conflicts that ended in military victory are thought to be less likely to erupt again, 
compared to those which ended in stalemate. The first explanation is that it reveals 
information on the relative strength of the victor. This knowledge is thought to act as a 
                                          
35 For more comprehensive accounts refer to Sambanis (2002); for peace-building and peace operations in 
particular refer to Paris (2004). For a comprehensive overview on favourable environments for peacemaking 
refer to Stedman (1996). For arriving at peace settlements see Wallensteen (2012): pp.33.  
36 Gerring (2012): pp.66-67. 
37 I am indebted to Walter (2004): p. 372 for this distinction. 
38 Mason et.al (2011): p.171. 
39 Lyons (2002): p.13.  
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deterrent for potential rebels.40 Secondly, the winner is likely to have gained control over 
the organisational infrastructure, making it increasingly difficult for rebels to find an 
opportunity for rebellion.41 In situations during which the conflict parties are in a military 
deadlock because neither of them have the capacities for military victory, i.e. stalemate, 
an end to the conflict by the means of a peace accord is likely since it increases the 
parties interest for cooperation.42 Since this paper only examines cases which ended in a 
CPA, the theory on military victory is not of particular relevance for this paper and was 
only included due to its paramount role in theories on conflict recurrence.43  
Those authors concerned with how the previous conflict was fought, consider the length 
of the conflict and its deadliness to play a substantial role on the chances of war 
recurrence. In short, the severity of a war can be a predictor for the likelihood of renewed 
conflict. In that sense, the more costly a war was in terms of resources and duration, the 
less likely it is to erupt again because of the resulting war fatigue. War fatigue is often 
proxied by the percentage of the population killed during the conflict44, which bears some 
caveats due to data unreliability.45 More than once a researcher will come across 
population size or death toll estimates which vary among several thousand.46 Hence, 
studies most commonly try to take into account the length of a previous conflict as a 
proxy.47  
In contrast with the two more minimalistic explanations, the third category regards 
characteristics within a state, often in relation to the previous conflict, as most important 
for the explanation of conflict recurrence. The discourse can roughly be divided into the 
categories of ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’. ‘Greed’ advocates in part explain civil war in terms of 
the economic feasibility of rebellion, i.e. the lack of alternative sources of income makes 
the recruitment of rebels an easily accomplished task.48 Conflicts are thought to be simply 
motivated by greed for material resources. Under these conditions, maintaining peace is 
thought to be difficult, since it is always in the interest of rebels to “acquire more goods 
by using force.”49 This school of thought also emphasizes the negative effect of natural 
                                          
40 Refer to Walter (2004): p.374. 
41 Mason et al (2011): p.173. 
42 Zartman (2001): p.8. 
43 Refer to studies by Snyder, Brancati (2011a) and (2011b); Walter (2004).  
44 Also done by other authors, such as Snyder and Brancati (2011): p.14; Lacina and Gleditsch (2005). 
45 Simons and Zanker (March 2012): p.14. 
46 For example, the death toll estimate of the war in Bosnia ranges between 150,000 and 250,000; see 
Bassiouni (2011): p.228. 
47 Hoddie, Hartzell, Rothchild (2001): p.190; Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (2001); Walter (2002) employs 
both deaths and duration as her indicators. 
48 Collier, Hoeffler, Sambanis (2005): p.7. 
49 Sambanis (2002): p.221. 
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resource endowment on sustainable peace.50 The ‘resource curse’ was later on refined to 
have particular validity in countries with large quantities of petroleum product exports.51 
The greed perspective, dominated by logit-regression analysis and hardly backed up by 
evidence from comparative case study, has been criticised for its lack of recognition that 
its ‘feasibility’ hypothesis can also be explained by shifting the emphasis to grievances.52 
In that sense, the literature concerned with grievances argues that low income 
encourages rebellion because continuous poverty and a low living standard function as 
triggers in themselves, encouraging popular discontent.53 From that follows the belief that 
so-called ‘horizontal inequalities’ (an unequal distribution of resources in a society) are the 
reason for conflict.54 Thus, rebellion becomes ‘feasible’ due to grievances created by 
inequality rather than material self-interest. Yet another drift in the grievances perspective 
uses the notion of ‘identity’ as an additional explanatory factor. Grievances of one distinct 
group which exist due to horizontal inequalities are thereby instrumentalised by political 
entrepreneurs for mobilization.55 The theory has been criticised for being prone to 
endogeneity, since both identity and inequality are likely to be affected by conflict, making 
it impossible to detect the causal direction.56 Furthermore, inequality is a question of 
perception and can hardly be objectified. Finding the right indicator thus becomes a 
hardly insurmountable challenge.57 Additional reservations have to be made with regards 
to the measurement of identity, since it is difficult to define a measure which is 
“applicable across many different types of societies", especially because states tend to 
have multiple cleavages (i.e. societies).58 As a consequence, some have found a 
statistically relevant relationship, while others have not.59  
Within the ‘grievance’, ‘horizontal inequalities’ literature evidence has emerged which links 
economic incentives, favoured by the ‘greed’ strand of literature, to political processes. 
They found that the role of economic incentives in conflict mobilisation is found to 
                                          
50 Sambanis (2003): p.24; Collier and Hoeffler (2005). 
51 De Soysa and Neumayer (2007): p.215. 
52 Keen (2012): p.757; Holmqvist (2012): p.13.  
53 Collier (2009): p.124.  
54 The most prominent account on “Horizontal Income Inequalities” is Stewart (2004), pointed out in Keen 
(2012). Also refer to Roeder and Rothchild (2005a): pp.45-6.  
55 Snyder (2000).  
56 Holmqvist (2012): p. 15. 
57 Ibid.: p. 15. 
58 Norris (2005): p.17 
59 Examples of quantitative analysis of the relationship between identity and conflict include Hartzell, Hoddie, 
Rothchild (2001):  p.198/199; Walter (2002): p.89; for an excellent discussion of the different results and 
possible causes see Sambanis (2002): p.230. 
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diminish, the greater the inclusiveness of the political system.60 The origins of greed are 
thereby grievances which can be addressed by providing an environment which enables 
actors to make credible commitments to abstain from violence.61 The emphasis on 
creating an environment where commitment becomes possible since “neither greed nor 
grievance alone is sufficient to explain the incidence of violence” has been the subject of 
the World Development Report in 2011.62 The report argues that in order to reduce 
violent conflict, institutions and mechanisms have to be present, which enable reform and 
a break with the past. This has also been emphasized in some recent publications, 
concerned specifically with war recurrence.63  
The interlinked function of greed and grievance, during which the electoral process 
exacerbates already existing commitment problems in the absence of security inducing 
factors is the focus of this paper. The next chapter elaborates on why democracy, and 
elections, are thought to provide a framework for peaceful conflict resolution while 
overlooking the differences between societies at peace and those just having undergone 
violent conflict.  
2.2  Replacing Bullets with Ballots 
In the following chapter I will explore the idea that elections can function as a means for 
war termination. Understanding where this idea comes from will elucidate certain 
theoretical considerations of the democracy-conflict nexus. 
The idea of democracy as a remedy to violent conflict first gained new attention from 
practitioners and academics alike due to the foreign policy of former American president 
Woodrow Wilson after World War I.64 According to the then propagated view, democracy, 
“a system of community and cooperation”, would make governments just per definition, 
since “social conflicts that might become violent are resolved through voting”65 and 
demilitarisation of politics occurs.66 Bullets are replaced with ballots.  
The ‘peace through democracy’ thesis was significantly backed up by early empirical 
evidence from the political scientist Michael Doyle, who found that democracies are less 
                                          
60 Discussed in Keen (2012): p.771 with regards to the comparative merits of the greed versus grievance 
debate. 
61 The reverse argument can be found in Holmqvist (2012): p.17. 
62 World Bank (2011): p.75.  
63 Mason et al (2011) who emphasize the importance of the conflict environment, Call (2012) with a focus on 
the danger of political exclusion in the post-war environment as well as Lemarchand (2006): p.2. 
64 Paris (2004): p.40.  
65 Rummel (1995): p.4. 
66 Lyons (2002): p.7. 
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likely to engage in violent conflict.67 Doyle’s formative publication which laid much of the 
foundation for contemporary conflict studies and policy was, however, based on inter- 
rather than intra- state conflict. 
Adapting the ‘peace through democracy’ thesis to states just having undergone intra-state 
conflict bares some caveats. The peace-inducing effect of democracy can be attributed to 
two factors, namely civil rights and political liberties. Both are often not present following 
intra-state conflict.68  No country becomes a democracy overnight. Instead, it has to 
undergo the often painful period of liberalisation.69 However, the relationship between 
liberalisation and peace is not the same as between democracy and peace. During the 
liberalisation phase, “countries become more war-prone, not less.”70  
The lack of firm regulations and a centralized state increases the insecurity of actors since 
they cannot rely on the state to defend them against violent behaviour.71 This clears the 
way for a political environment in which there are incentives for people to undertake 
collective action, so-called political opportunity structures.72 In that sense, periods of 
leadership change indicate moments of heightened political opportunities, where potential 
insurgents may become mobilised and resort to violence.73 This is contingent on the fact 
that elections are a period of increased uncertainty, because they determine who 
governs.74 At the same time, deciding who governs and “how power will be concentrated 
are fundamental conditions for war termination.”75 Nevertheless we have to recognise 
that the conduct of elections in a context of high insecurity, as is the case in post-conflict 
countries, can result in a security dilemma. This is especially true in post-conflict countries 
if the question ‘who will govern’ had previously incited a violent conflict.  
A security dilemma occurs, when “competing ethnic, religious, and political actors [...] 
mobilize against the possibility of future threats, triggering a cascading tit-for-tat 
escalation and polarization from other segments of society.”76 As a result, the more actors 
try to increase their own security, the less secure others will feel or vice versa.77 Micro-
level explanations equate security dilemmas with the presence of spoilers, i.e. those 
                                          
67 Doyle (1986). 
68 Rummel (1997): p.163. 
69 Mansfield and Snyder (1995): p.79 
69 Snyder (2000). 
70 Mansfield and Snyder (1995): p.79 
71 Snyder (2000): p.27. 
72 This argument draws from social movement theory. For a review of the literature refer to Vermeersch 
(2011). 
73 Gleditsch and Ruggeri (2007): p.21; Paris (2004): p. 163. 
74 Reilly (2008): p. 161. 
75 Stedman (1996): p.747.  
76 Reilly (2008): p.160. 
77 Binningsbø (2005): p.4.  
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elements in a post-conflict state who feel threatened by the potential new order and 
hence use violence to try to undermine it.78 Both approaches share the notion that 
violence may be used in a context of insecurity as deterrence against a future threat. 
The insights from this perspective depart from the early transitology literature by 
suggesting that elections are more than just an indicator of success in the transition from 
one regime type to the next, especially in post-conflict contexts.79 They should be 
considered a process with institutional incentives and opportunity structures80 which can 
incite and accelerate violence prior to the establishment of civil liberties, and eventually 
democratisation.81 If then one views elections as a process, and not just an indicator, the 
effects of the electoral process start prior to the actual conduct of an election. The eve of 
the election can be considered a focal point because it represents the temporary 
culmination of that process, but elections cast their shadow long before.82  
Taking the predominant attention off the election itself and instead focussing on the 
process set in motion by an election, we can better understand why election related 
violence may occur over a long time-span and at many different points in the process: it 
occurs on the eve of an election, during its actual conduct, or as a result of how it is 
conducted (see Model 1). Without careful management of the elections themselves as 
well as the period prior to their conduct, the social forces underlying a country’s most 
important conflicts are likely to be mobilised. In this way “an election can bring to head 
the very conflict it is supposed to sort out and itself lead to violence.”83 The nature of the 
‘transitional period’ “will form the context in which former combatants and future voters assess 
their prospects and make decisions to either organize in a manner that supports the peace 
process or prepare for a return to war.”
84
 Accordingly, the period under examination for this 
paper is the ‘transitional period’, which begins from the signing of the CPA until the 
conduct of the first post-conflict election.85  
The model to be introduced in the next chapter describes the phenomenon of elections 
serving as a focal point for violence rather than a demilitarisation of politics and connects 
it to the explanatory factors that I regard as most influential with regards to the 
recurrence of conflict following a national election.   
                                          
78 Stedman (1996): pp. 369- 371. 
79 Lindberg (2009): p.4 refers to previous work by Linz and Stepan (1996), O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), 
Huntington (1991). 
80 Lindberg (2009): xxii. 
81 Leonard (2011): p.39. 
82 Refer to Reilly (2008) and Paris (2004): pp.151-78. 
83 Leonard (2011): p.37. 
84 Lyons (2002): p.7. 
85 Guttieri and Piombo (2007): pp.3-34.  
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3. The Model – Elections as a Critical Turning Point 
My question, why are post-conflict elections only in some cases successful in preventing 
the recurrence of conflict, implies that the holding of elections is implicitly regarded as an 
end goal that any country moves towards once it has signed a CPA.86 In this sense, the 
conduct of elections can no longer exclusively be attributed to the involvement of Western 
powers.87 The demand for elections, and democracy, is also no longer restricted to certain 
cultures. Some view the Arab spring as a pro-democracy movement, “confirming that 
demands for democracy transcend such cultural differences.”88 Popular demands for 
elections were also raised in Nepal, where Maoist rebels demanded elections to end the 
conflict in 2006.89  In Africa, the African Union adopted in 2007 the African Charter on 
Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), illustrating the continent’s commitment 
to democracy.90 How post-conflict elections will play out, however, will be determined by 
the institutional and structural conditions in place during the ‘transitional phase’.91  
Putting oneself into the shoes of those you try to understand can provide a useful basis 
for analysis92 because it enables the researcher to isolate those security concerns which 
make committing to peace difficult, even after a country has achieved the first step of 
signing a CPA.93 The true test of a transitional government comes with holding a peaceful 
election, even if the government appears to be making headway.94 After signing a peace 
agreement, rebels or government have essentially two options; either:  
1) They decide to cooperate and move towards war termination by committing to the 
holding of peaceful post-conflict national, legislative elections (as was the case in South 
Africa in 1994); or 
 2) They realise scheduled elections could leave them without a place in government and 
thus vulnerable to the abuse by the election winner, thus they decide to defect, to not 
                                          
86 Shain and Linz (1995) employ the same premise in their seminal book on examining the role interim 
administrations play with regards to the subsequent regime type. The notion is also shared by Lyons (2002).   
87 Serwer (2007): p.348. 
88 Wallensteen (2012): p.139. 
89 Snyder and Brancati (2011a): p.473. 
90 This is pointed out by Leonard (2011): p.42. 
91 Shain and Linz (1995): p.102.  
92 See Collier (2009): p. 30 for very insightful scenarios of a dictator’s options for actions faced with 
democratisation. 
93 Refer to Hartzell, Hoddie, Rothchild (2001): p.185, who point out the overwhelming influence of 
institutional factors and the structural environment. 
94 Asserted by Sullivan (2005): p.93. 
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implement the terms of the agreement, and to resort to violence, whether they become a 
perpetrator themselves or encourage it.95   
 
Model 1 - Elections as a Critical Turning Point 
 
Option two can take different forms. In its most simple form (Variant a, see Model 1) the 
more marginalised group feels threatened by an election and resorts to war.96 The 
outbreak of the Rwandan conflict following the signing of the Arusha Accord has been 
attributed to such fear of an election.97 The start of the electoral process triggered the 
traditionally politically marginalised Hutus to defect from the peace process. This was in 
part due to the late deployment of a smaller than promised United Nation’s (UN) peace 
operation, calling into question the credibility of the UN’s commitment to monitor, verify 
and sanction defection from the peace process. Furthermore, the promised power-sharing 
                                          
95 For variations on violence related to the breakdown of electoral processes refer to Fischer (2002). 
96 Refer to Leonard (2011): p.45 for a discussion on the causes of pre- and post-election violence.  
97 Reilly (2008): p.164; Paris (2004): pp.75-76; Leonard (2011). 
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deal was not implemented. The transitional context was thus characterised by uncertainty 
and insecurity. Defection from the peace process can furthermore be expressed through 
electoral fraud (Variant b), which in turn is likely to lead to mobilisation by citizens or the 
opposition (as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic 
in 2011).98 A further possibility (Variant c) is that one of the actors (rebels or ancien 
régime) assumes they will come out as the winner of the election, and are then proven 
wrong. This caused a recurrence of conflict in Angola, when UNITA, the party of the 
warlord Jonas Savimbi, lost the election despite proclaiming already weeks before that 
their victory was certain.99  
Whatever modification of option two we look at, defection can be viewed as rational 
insofar as there have been no signs of power concessions (IV2), there are no mechanisms 
for generating trust and punishing defectors (IV1) and violence and oppression from the 
election winner seems a very real possibility. 100 Rational is used here to mean that 
decisions are dependent on perceived costs and benefits of one’s actions.101 The electoral 
process thus exaggerates the ‘shadow of the future’ from which the security dilemma 
arises because it increases uncertainty in an already insecure environment with no prior 
history of political cooperation.102  
From this, it follows that in order to solve the dilemma, a context of security has to be 
present from the signing of the CPA until the holding of the election, i.e. for the entire 
electoral process, so that “electoral conflict and violence [do not] become tactics in 
political competition.”103 Viewed in this way, “the central theme of civil war termination is 
'not evil, but tragedy’.”104  
I propose that the stakes of the electoral process can be reduced through the presence of 
two security inducing factors. In her seminal work, Walter (2002) showed that the 
robustness of external security guarantees (IV1) and the degree of inclusiveness of 
political institutions (IV2) are the most significant explanatory factors for the 
implementation of a peace agreement.105 I argue that the independent variables 
furthermore ensure the conditions for elections functioning as a means for war 
                                          
98 This is most likely done by the former incumbent. Refer to Collier (2009): p. 35; and p. 70 for the 
importance of access to infrastructure in electoral fraud. 
99 Ottaway (1998): p.143. 
100 Walter (2002): p.30; Rothchild (2005a): pp.248-49.  
101 Fortna (2004): p.11. 
102 The phrase ‘shadow of the future’ was first employed by Axelrod (1984).  
103 Fischer (2002): p.8.  
104 Stedman (1997): p.9 
105 Walter (2002):  p.17.  
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termination106, because they provide the necessary security for actors to commit to the 
electoral process. Managing the processes which give rise to security dilemmas and 
commitment problems will determine what path a country takes following the post-conflict 
election: war termination or recurrence of conflict.107 
The process, where insecurities are managed by my independent variables can be 
expressed in a model (Model 2: Reducing the stakes of the electoral process through 
guarantees).  
 
Model 2 – Reducing the Stakes of the Electoral Process through Guarantees 
3.1 Safe Structural Environment – Deterring Violence (IV1) 
Following the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement, the local security context 
remains volatile and can easily be interrupted by a security dilemma or spoilers (see 
Chapter 2.2). Whether these spoilers manage to interrupt the peace process or not 
depends on “the role played by international actors as custodians of peace.”108   
Peace operations have in several studies proven to have a positive effect on peace109 , 
whereby the risk of more fighting drops by 70%110, and the insecurity associated with 
                                          
106 Ibid.: p.3. 
107 Lyons (2002): p.9.  
108 Stedman (1997): p.6. 
109 E.g. Snyder and Brancati (2011a). 
110 Fortna (2004): p.285. 
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political competition, such as, elections, is reduced.111 While, as it has been pointed out 
elsewhere, “the terminology of peace operations is notoriously slipper”, the term ‘peace 
operation’ is used in this paper to refer to a multinational force aimed at restoring or 
preserving peace.112 Often, the national army has lost local legitimacy during the war or it 
has been disbanded following the conflict, for example as part of a security sector 
reform.113 The presence of an outside force, i.e. a peace operation, can consequently 
provide conflict parties with security guarantees, in part because they are considered as 
more legitimate and/or impartial as a single state.114 The term security guarantee refers 
to the promise of a third party to verify, monitor and enforce post-treaty behaviour, if 
necessary also by force, increasing the incentives of the parties to the conflict to stick to 
the peace process.115 
The legitimacy of an outside force cannot be regarded as a given, however. There may be 
situations where the peace operation does lack legitimacy and is not regarded as impartial 
by all actors on the ground. The continued occurrence of atrocities while an international 
peace operation is present can also lead to a lack of legitimacy and a loss of credibility, as 
it was the case under the ECOMOG forces in Liberia in 1990.116 The legitimacy gap is, 
however, more likely to occur in different subcategories of peace operations, namely in 
what one might call a ‘humanitarian intervention’ (Bosnia) or a ‘democratic intervention’ 
(Iraq), where the intervening force has no authorisation from the parties to the conflict.117 
When there is a lack of legitimacy of the third party guarantee and trust respectively, the 
deterring function of a peace operation is seriously jeopardised, as indicated in the 
examples above. 
Peace operations have evolved since the first ever UN Mission, the United Nations Truce 
Supervision Organization (UNTSO) that was deployed to the Middle East in 1948. In the 
1990s a major paradigm shift in peacekeeping occurred, in part triggered by a changing 
geo-political environment. During the Cold War, article 2.7 of the UN charter which 
specifies that “issues which are ‘essentially within the domestic jurisdiction’ of a state 
should not be of concern to the UN, and thus not be internationalized”, prevented the UN 
                                          
111 Refer to Snyder and Brancati (2011b): p.1.  
112 Pointed out by Paris (2004): p.38. 
113 This was for example the case 2001 in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The legitimate use of 
force by the national army is often challenged by armed rebels. Creating a monopoly of force for a national 
army is hence one of the first, and most daunting, challenges.  
114 Khosla (2003): p. 47; Wallensteen (2012): p.144. 
115 Refer to Walter (2002): p.64-65; Stedman (1996): p.746 on the use of force as a deterrent.  
116 Dupuy and Detzel (2007): p. 9 and 11. 
117 For further information on the different types of intervention and the role of legitimacy, refer to Grimm 
(2010). 
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from interfering in internal conflicts.118 The former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali 
published in 1992 “An Agenda for Peace”, capturing the new-found confidence of external 
actors with regards to the role they can play following an intrastate conflict: 
“peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of 
conflict and the making of peace.”119 Operations, which were previously “defined as 
outside the parameters of international action, with reference to Article 2.7”, started to be 
regarded as legitimate, leading to an expansion of peace operations.120 
The growth in demand was endorsed by the UN. In 2001, the UN published “No Exit 
without Strategy”, which amongst other things stresses the role external actors can play 
in “in facilitating the restoration of mutual confidence.”121 Fortna (2008) argues that 
“peacekeepers can have a causal, rather than spurious, effect on the stability of peace if, 
inter alia, they reduce the likelihood of aggression by raising the costs of war or the 
benefits of peace for the peace kept and they can deter or prevent one side from 
reneging on a political deal and excluding the other from power."122 This effect hinges on 
the credibility of a peace operation, however. Credibility depends on “rapid deployment, 
proper resourcing, ability to deter spoilers and the ability to manage expectations.”123  
Regional organisations have also started to adapt to the increasing demand for peace 
operations. While the first regional peace operation took place in the same year as the 
first UN mission, carried out by the Organisation of American States in Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua, there has been a real diversification of actors undertaking peace operations 
since the 1990s. By now, missions undertaken by the Organisation of West African States 
(ECOWAS) and the African Union (and until 2002 its predecessor the Organisation of 
African Unity), and the European Union are increasingly common124; there have also been 
the so far three Russian-led Missions in Georgia, Moldova and Tajikistan under the 
umbrella of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 
                                          
118 Wallensteen (2012): p.132 
119 United Nations (1992): Paragraph 20. 
120 Wallensteen (2012): p.133. 
121 United Nations (2001): Pargaraph 9.  
122 Fortna (2008): p.86.  
123 Bellamy; Williams and Griffin (2010): p.142.  
124 The EU authorised this year alone three new missions, the EU Aviation Security Mission in South Sudan 
(EUAVSEC South Sudan), the Regional Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP NESTOR) and 
the EU-Mission in Niger (EUCAP SAHEL Niger). 
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Figure 1: Peace Operations and Internal Conflict 125  3 
Despite the increase in peace operations deployed in intrastate conflict over the period 
1948 -2004 (see Figure 1), by far not all internal conflicts are subject to an international 
peace mission. It seems that the saying, "Peux ce que veux. Allons-y." 126, memorably 
employed by the head of the United Nations Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), Rome Dallaire, 
in a telegram to the secretariat of the United Nations in January 1994 when requesting 
more military personnel in the prelude to the Rwandan Genocide, does not hold true in all 
circumstances. Some researchers have tried to elucidate the factors that determine where 
peace operations are sent.127 In principle, the question of a conflict being “a threat to or 
an endangerment of the maintenance of international peace and security” guides the 
deployment of a UN peace operation (no matter whether this is a Chapter VI or VII 
mission).128  While there are still no paramount investigations on the determinants of the 
deployment of regional peace operations, it appears that the rationale is the same as for 
UN missions.129 Early research tends to emphasize national security interests as being the 
primary explanatory factor for UN intervention, essentially claiming that “any UN decision 
125 Heldt and Wallensteen (2006): p.17.  
126 Author’s own translation: “If there is a will, there is a way”; Quotation taken from United Nations (1999): 
http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/1967799.36552048.html, last accessed 05.02.2013. p.10. 
127 E.g.: Gilligan and Stedman (2003); Fortna (2004). 
128 Gilligan and Stedman (2003): p.37. 
129 Refer to Bellamy and Williams (2005).  
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to intervene […] will reflect the dominant power of the intervening side and the relative 
importance of the subject nation.”130 The national interest of the five permanent members 
of the Security Council (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States) 
and the extent to which the conflict is perceived by them as a threat can hereby be 
regarded as the most important determinant for intervention.131 Other authors, such as 
Jakobsen, dispute the thesis that national interest is the sine qua non.132 The CNN effect, 
the theory that television news coverage has an agenda setting function thereby forcing 
national governments to respond to humanitarian crises, also plays according to him an 
important role in the decision to deploy a peace operation. A peace operation is most 
likely to be deployed “when there is both a high probability of success and low probability 
of casualties.”133 Gilligan and Stedman (2003) find in their quantitative study that deadly 
conflicts in countries with a relatively small government army are the most likely receivers 
of UN intervention. Whether the country is a former colony of a permanent member of 
the Security Council, has high levels of primary commodity exports are, amongst other 
factors, not correlated to the likelihood of intervention.134  
Following on from the above described empirical evidence, the chances for success of an 
election in functioning as a means for war termination can be increased through the 
presence of robust external security guarantees. The robustness of an external security 
guarantee depends on its legitimacy and its credibility (further refined in Chapter 4.2). 
This leads me to the following hypothesis for my first independent variable, IV1:  
H 1: The more robust external security guarantees, the less likely the 
recurrence of conflict following a national election. 
 
3.2 Credible Institutional Guarantees –Addressing Grievances (IV2) 
“Democratic survival and breakdown are a question of political crafting.”135 The truth of 
that statement also holds true when thinking about the initial ‘crafting’ of democracy, 
following violent internal conflict. The type of crafting employed for the transitional 
period, i.e. the period after a country signed a CPA but prior to its first post-conflict 
election, is regarded as “crucial in determining the subsequent regime, and may affect 
                                          
130 Bennis (1996): p.84 
131 Oudraat (1996): pp. 518-519. 
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whether ethnic and regional conflicts will interfere with the prospects for long-term 
stability.”136 The crafting of political institutions is here particularly important. Institutions 
are defined, following North, as "the constraints that human beings impose on 
themselves."137 Obeying to these constraints, when present in the ‘transitional phase’, can 
serve as costly signals to the parties of the conflict, thus decreasing their security concern 
and the stakes associated with the election. ‘Costly signals’ in this context mean that the 
actors signal what their intentions for future behaviour are. This information can thereby 
increase the chances of commitment to peace because it decreases the chances for 
miscalculations and a resulting security dilemma.138 Political pacts139 aim to maximise the 
stakeholders of the political game and thereby increase the incentives to play by the 
rules.140 They are thus a form of an institutional guarantee, whereby the stakes posed by 
electoral competition are reduced through advancing reconciliation and addressing 
grievances by the means of power-sharing..   
The concept of institutional guarantees is greatly associated with the work by Arend 
Lijphart, who was interested in the question of why societies such as the Netherlands or 
Belgium, which are divided along religious, ideological or linguistic lines, were able to live 
together peacefully. His main observation was the prevalence of what he termed the 
‘consociational nature’ of political institutions. For Lijphart, “elite cooperation was the 
primary distinguishing feature of consociational democracy.”141  
The power-sharing concept found adherents within conflict studies, and within peace-
building circles more specifically, since societies which have undergone conflict can also 
be regarded as divided, thus struggling to find a common basis for cooperation.142 Since I 
take the grievances perspective with regards to sustained conflict, the fundamental idea 
of Lijphart’s work to incorporate groups rather than exclude them in order to overcome 
those grievances makes consociationalism a natural starting point of inquiry.  
The institutional features which Lijphart considered to lead to the greatest degree of 
cooperation were executive power-sharing among a ‘grand coalition’ of political leaders; a 
mutual veto, requiring all parties to agree on political processes and protecting minorities; 
136 Shain and Linz (1995).  
137 North (1990): p.5. 
138 Refer to Fearon (1995) for costly signalling. The concept is equally employed in Walter (2002).  
139 In the following, consociationalism, power-sharing and political pact will be used interchangeably. 
140 Norris (2005): p.4. 
141 Lijphart (1977): p.1. 
142 Binningsbø (2005): p.4. 
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the proportional representation of major groups; and a high degree of segmental 
autonomy, i.e. a degree of territorial autonomy.143 
 Lijphart’s work was subsequently the foundation for many further investigations on 
power-sharing. O’Leary and McGarry used Ireland as a case study and found that cross-
community executive power-sharing, in which each significant segment “is represented in 
the government with at least plurality levels of support within its segment”, creates 
conducive conditions for elite cooperation.144 The authors hence greatly favour grand 
coalition governments. This institutional set-up seeks to induce stability into the political 
system through guaranteed group representation, amongst other things reducing the 
winner-take-all effect of an election. Under different circumstances, even the voters may 
fear too much what the losers will do. Charles Taylor, the brutal warlord who controlled 
Liberia for much of the 1990s, was excluded from the peace process. When it came to 
elections in 1997 which he won overwhelmingly, voters said they voted for him out of fear 
what a continued exclusion may result in.145 
While Lijphart and O’Leary and McGarry were mainly interested in the distribution of 
political power more generally, another strand of literature focuses on the capacities of 
institutional structures to increase the likelihood of post-conflict stability. Most noteworthy 
in that field of research is the work of Mathew Hoddie and Caroline Hartzell, who apply 
the concept of power-sharing to the post-conflict context.146 The core questions they 
address are 1) whether power-sharing has a positive effect on peace during the transition 
phase and 2) whether power-sharing creates the conditions for elections.147 They argue 
that when power-sharing provisions are present during the transition phase, “they tend to 
send reassuring signals to parties to the conflict that their vital concerns will not be 
ignored or attacked following the establishment of peace and a new government.”148 This 
observation extends not only to political institutions but all institutional arrangements, 
including territorial, military and economic pacts.149 The authors examine de jure power-
sharing provisions, as stipulated in a peace agreement. They argue that no matter 
                                          
143 Refer to Norris (2005): p.3 for a comprehensive overview of Lijphart’s concepts.  
144 Refer to Wolff (2011): p. 4 for an overview of the adaptations and diversification of consociationalism in 
contemporary peace-building strategies.   
145 Lyons (1998): p.190.   
146 Hartzell and Hoddie (2005a): pp.83-107. 
147 Ibid.: p.83. 
148 Ibid.: p. 84. 
149 For definitions of these types of pacts please refer to Ibid.: pp.86-90. 
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whether the agreed terms are implemented or not, they serve as a “costly signal of the 
parties’ commitment to accept a common rule” and refrain from using violence.150  
The literature on institutional incentive structures designed to reduce the stakes 
associated with democracy, i.e. elections, has started to examine the integration of 
former rebel movements into the political party system.151 The Democratic Party of 
Kosovo (DPK) and its leader Hashim Thaçi, the former leader of the Kosovo Liberation 
Front (KLF) the integration of former rebels into Tajikistan’s post-conflict government 
(1997); or the continuing participation in politics of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) are 
only some examples of rebel movements transforming into formal political players. These 
parties tend to lack a clear political strategy and experience, often leading to a 
propagation of those divisions which caused the conflict in the first place.152 According to 
the power-sharing rationale, the potential danger of integrating former rebel groups into 
the political party system during the ‘transitional phase’ can be reduced through the 
presence of coalition governments. In their “quest for the median voter”, politicians are 
expected to “crowd the centre”, thus moderating their interests and contributing to 
reconciliation among the former warring factions.153 
Whilst the integration of former rebel groups has the clear advantage of creating an 
incentive structure which makes their recourse to bullets less likely, some authors have 
also pointed out the inherent problems associated with this development.154 Examples of 
the critique include that rebel movements are not homogenous actors. In the case of 
Sierra Leone (1999), political power-sharing empowered the political leader Sankoh, who 
had “no control over the more militarily geared wing of RUF.”155 The subsequent 
breakdown of the Lomé agreement has been attributed to misconceiving RUF as a unitary 
actor and consequently empowering a political actor without the ability to encourage 
moderation within the rebel movement, which was the reason for empowerment in the 
first place.156 Furthermore, the rebels might lack legitimacy in the eyes of the 
population.157 Another danger is that a rebel only wants to capture the presidency and 
has no interest in cooperation. Thus, power-sharing should not give disproportionately 
                                          
150 Hartzell and Hoddie (2005a): p.84. 
151 For a review of the literature, including the advantages and disadvantages, refer to de Zeeuw and Curtis 
(2010). 
152 Refer to Snyder (2000) who argues that elections in the democratisation phase the lack of clear political 
strategies leads to political appeals along former conflict lines. 
153 Reilly (2008): p.178. 
154 Refer to the discussion in Sririam (2008).  
155 Dupuy and Binningsbø (2007): p.22. 
156 Ibid.: p.22. 
157 Morgan (2007): p.31. 
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large powers to one actor enabling him to act in such a way, as in Liberia 1997.158 This 
final argument in particular, potentially making the power-sharing regime prone to 
“reproducing insurgent violence”159, calls to mind democratisation scholars’ words of 
caution about continued participation of the former elite during the transition of 
democracy.160 These examples show that those in charge of installing a transitional 
government are faced with the challenge of differentiating between ‘authentic 
peacemakers’ and those who will continue the warlord tradition.161 
Some authors have criticised the power-sharing approach for taking the politicisation in 
societies divided by conflict as a given. This creates an institutional environment where 
there are no incentives to transcend traditional group affinity and thereby does not 
contribute to reconciliation among the former warring factions.162 Power-sharing is thus 
regarded as failing at what it aims to achieve, namely reconciliation and cooperation, 
because it is based on an institutionalisation of the same cleavages that developed during 
the conflict. The political system which was installed in Bosnia after Dayton is an example 
typically employed to illustrate the fallacy of power-sharing.163 
One has to differentiate between short term and long term institutions, however.164 As 
Roeder and Rothchild, some of the most adamant critics of power-sharing, note, power-
sharing can be “a progressive compromise”165 and “can work as shortcuts to habituation” 
for democratic governance.166 This is to say,  while power-sharing may not be the best 
basis for democratic governance in the long run, it presents one of the best options to 
end a conflict and set the conditions for democratisation, as has been confirmed by recent 
empirical studies.167  
In order to prevent elections serving as a turning point for renewed conflict, transitional 
institutions have to be designed in a way to overcome some legacies of the civil war, i.e. 
heightened distrust between the parties, by providing a context encouraging 
reconciliation, thereby promoting the demilitarisation of politics.168 Power-sharing 
institutions which empower a political minority at the cost of the majority “constitute a 
more credible commitment to respect the rights and interests of minorities in a postwar 
158 Dupuy and Detzel (2007): p.25. 
159 Refer to Tull and Mehler (2005).  
160 For a discussion on the topic refer to Pridham (2000). 
161 Spears (2002): p.132; Prendergast (1999): p.9. 
162 Snyder (2000): p. 329, mainly referring to the works by Donald Horowitz.  
163 Refer to Norris (2005): p.9. 
164 See for critique related to freezing of ethnic identities Horowitz (2000); Spears (2002). 
165 Roeder and Rothchild (2005a): p. 50. 
166 Di Palma (1990): p.87; also Wallensteen (2012): p. 149. 
167 Binningsbø (2005); Brancati and Snyder (2011a) and (2011b). 
168 Refer to Lyons (2002). 
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political arrangement.”169 Some authors have also found that experience with power-
sharing decreases the likelihood of elections later on being contested.170 
Addressing grievances and ensuring an inclusive process prior to the first post conflict 
election can reduce its stakes, thus preventing a recurrence of conflict. Since this is 
dependent on the inclusiveness of the political process, my second independent variable 
(IV 2) is the “Degree of Inclusiveness of Political Institutions” established in the 
transitional government. I derived from the above outlined theory the following 
hypothesis: 
H 2: The more inclusive the political institutions following the signing of a 
comprehensive peace agreement (CPA), the less likely recurrence of conflict 
following a national election. 
4. Operationalisation 
In the following, my previously defined concepts will be operationalised in order to test 
my hypotheses.  
4.1 Recurrence of Conflict Following a National Election (DV) 
The specific focus on the recurrence of conflict following a national election was chosen 
because elections can be viewed as a critical turning point, where a country can 
potentially move towards war termination as long as structural and institutional factors 
serve as safeguards, as outlined in Chapter 2.2.  
One of the main challenges faced when engaging in a study aimed at contributing to the 
‘peace-building’ debate, is to find appropriate implicit or explicit indicators for 
categorisation of the cases171, in order to have a cross-unit reference point.172 Given that 
peace is characterised by the absence of violence, similar research endeavours tend to 
employ the level of violence as the indicator when measuring a country’s progress. 
Typically, a threshold of ’25 battle related deaths’ or an even higher ‘1,000 battle related 
deaths’ threshold is used to determine a recurrence of conflict.173 Employing thresholds 
                                          
169 Roeder and Rothchild (2005b): p.344. 
170 Snyder and Brancati (2011a): p.472  
171 Simons and Zanker (2012): p.9. 
172 Gerring (2004): p.347. 
173 Examples include Jarstad (2008) and Snyder and Brancati (2011b).  
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for measurement poses some problems for post-conflict countries.174 Data collection in 
conflict regions is a hazardous task, making data availability a problem. Since the cases 
under examination typically lack civil rights or a free media, the latter is also not a reliable 
source.175 As a consequence, some cases may not be understood as being in conflict, 
simply because they narrowly miss an arbitrary threshold.176 Even authors who employ a 
threshold, such as Jarstad, note that “not all election-related violence is captured in the 
data” and hence one cannot draw conclusions on whether the elections were in fact 
peaceful.177 While I would not go as far as Zartman who argues that “such studies do not 
explain civil conflict, they explain conflict with more than 1,000 deaths, which is a bit like 
explaining human growth by starting at the age of 12 years”178, it is clear that relying on 
the presence of conflict merely by one absolute, numerical indicator does indeed not 
reveal all that much.  
Some studies try to overcome the problem by employing a proxy indicators. In line with 
the paradigm ‘security first’, the degree of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
(DDR) following conflict is a popular measure, since these studies assume that peace 
prospects and a party’s commitment to peace can be measured by their willingness to 
demobilise. These studies are in many cases prone to tautology since the degree of 
external involvement, i.e. peace operations, is used as an independent variable. The 
tautological problem this causes is that the degree of DDR is in many cases financed 
through peace operations, since national governments lack the financial capabilities.179 
Empirically speaking this measure is not without problems either, since there are cases 
where demobilisation did not take place, or was not even included as part of a peace 
agreement, and former conflict parties nevertheless stuck to the peace process, thus 
making it a poor proxy to measure peace.180   
Addressing the insufficient threshold indicator, I opted for a more differentiated 
assessment by adopting the coding of my DV from the Varieties of Democracy Codebook 
and its variable “1:26 Election other related violence.181 
                                          
174 Blattman and Miguel (2010): p.23; Simons and Zanker (2012): p.14.  
175 Ibid. (2012): p. 14 refer to a study on Guatemala where media coverage of killings decreased as 
repression by the state increased. 
176 Sambanis (2003): p.14. 
177 Jarstad (2009): p.51.  
178 Quoted in Holmqvist (2012): p.16.  
179 Swarbrick (2007): p.24.  
180 Tajikistan has had considerable difficulties with disarmament, but peaceful elections took place prior to 
completing disarmament, while in Bosnia-Herzegovina, "formal demobilisation was not even included in the 
1995 Dayton Peace Accords"; see GTZ (2001): p.30.  
181 Varieties of Democracy April 2012 Codebook <https://v-dem.net/faq/Codebook22APRIL2012.pdf>, p. 33. 
Last accessed 15.11.2012. 
Laura Wolfs: Democrazy?!    35 
Operationalisation: DV – Recurrence of violence following a national election  
00 – Conflict breaks out anew during the electoral process in the transitional phase (i.e. 
following the signing of the CPA prior to the conduct of the first national legislative post-
conflict election). 
0 - Widespread violence between civilians is occurring throughout the election period, or 
in an intense period of more than a week and in large swaths of the country. It resulted 
in a large number of deaths (at least 25) or displaced refugees. 
1 - There were significant levels of violence but not throughout the election period or 
beyond limited parts of the country. A few people may have died as a result (less than 
25), and some people may have been forced to move temporarily.  
2 - There were some outbursts of limited violence for a day or two, and only in a small 
part of the country. The number of injured and otherwise affected was relatively small. 
3 - There were only few instances of isolated violent acts, involving only a few people; no 
one died and very few were injured. 
4 – No recurrence of violence following a national election. 
 
Yes = high levels of post-electoral conflict based on the categories 00, 0, 1, 2 
No = low levels of post-electoral conflict based on the categories 3, 4 
 
The focus is on legislative/parliamentary national elections, as applied by Jarstad (2009). 
She found, that the degree of fairness of an election did not have an effect on an 
elections ‘war-termination’ or ‘war-inducing’ potential. 182 Since this is what l seek to 
examine in this paper, the degree of fairness will not be taken as an additional indicator. 
Elections and Violence – The need for a Dynamic Timeframe? 
In Chapter 5.3 I will elaborate how the phenomenon of post-conflict elections requires me 
to determine my timeframe in relation to the conduct of a country’s first post-conflict 
election. It shall hence suffice to say here that if a conflict breaks out anew during the 
electoral process, i.e. following the signing of the CPA prior to the conduct of the first 
national legislative post-conflict election (as defined in Chapter 3 as Variant a of the 
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model), my case study analysis will examine whether this breakdown is related to my 
explanatory variables.  
For information on the dates and type of the election, the website Election Guide will be 
consulted.183 Recently, a number of projects tried to evaluate the effect elections have 
across a scale of autocracy and democracy. One example is the Codebook for the National 
Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) Dataset. It provides information on 
elections since 1960 and includes a variable on electoral violence, which codes whether 
there is “significant violence involving civilian deaths immediately before, during, or after 
the election.”184 The NELDA variable also explicitly examines whether violence amongst 
civilians occurs, since they consider that as an indicator for elections where 
competiveness, and thus its contribution to democratisation, is likely to be hampered.185 
Another dataset for crosschecking results in NELDA is the Armed Conflict Location and 
Events Dataset (ACLED), which includes data on armed conflict for most African and Asian 
countries and specifies the origin and perpetrators of violence.186 For additional 
information, the archive LexisNexis will be consulted.187  
The scale will allow me to make a more differentiated assessment and to not become a 
subject of the above described threshold fallacy. Since the outbreak of war is also 
perceived as a process, a nuanced approach can observe a trend for each case and allows 
for better analysis of variation amongst the cases studied.188 When the cases examined 
score a level 3 or 4 as defined by my scale on the previous page, we can consider a 
country to be largely at peace.  
 
4.2 Robust External Security Guarantees (IV1)  
As outlined in my theoretical discussion, I regard the presence of robust external security 
guarantees, materialised as an international peace operation, as an explanatory factor in 
relation to the recurrence of violence following a national election. A peace operation can 
during the ‘transitional period’ prior to the election monitor, verify and sanction defection 
                                          
183 Election Guide: http://www.electionguide.org/, last accessed 05.02.2013.  
184 Refer to Nelda33 in “National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy: Contact and Data Access” 
http://hyde.research.yale.edu/nelda/#contact; the most recent codebook (Codebook for Version 3 of the 
dataset, last updated August 15 2012) is only available via this contact form. Date accessed: 26.11.2012). 
185 Refer to Hyde and Marinov (2012).  
186 Armed Conflict Location and Events Dataset, http://www.acleddata.com/data; last accessed 10.12.2012 
187 Access via the library of Freie Universität Berlin. www.lexisnexis.com, last access 10.12.2012 
188 Refer to Regan and Norton (2005).  
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from the peace process, thereby contributing to the establishment of mutual 
confidence.189 A robust security guarantee can only be regarded as such when an outside 
force came in with the mandate it promised, at the time it promised. Peace operations 
that came in with a significantly reduced mandate will thus be coded as a ‘weak’ security 
guarantee.190 The underlying logic is that in these cases the third party commitment is not 
credible and hence will not act as a deterrent for the use of force of one of the warring 
parties.191  
 
Operationalisation: weak /strong (binary variable)192 
No security guarantee 
Promise to protect but mandate and force not defined 
Willingness to deploy verification mission of under 500 observer 
 
 
Willingness to deploy verification mission of at least 500 observers 
Willingness to deploy an armed peacekeeping force of less than 5000 
Willingness to deploy an armed peacekeeping force of at least 5000 
 
Weak security guarantee = verification mission, international observer mission 0,1,2 
Robust security guarantee = presence of an international peacekeeping mission  3,4,5 
 
The threshold of the categories is based on examination of peace operations. The 
‘under/at least 500’ threshold for categories (2) and (3) was determined by the fact that 
half of all missions with no mandate to use force have a peak personnel of under 500.193   
One core principle guiding the definition of peace operations used by the UN is the 
consent of the parties.194 This classification was also employed for the selection of 
                                          
189 Walter (2002): pp.22-25. 
190 Significant here means that the personnel deployed should at least equal 95 per cent of the promised 
contingent. 
191 Following Walter (2002): p. 66. 
192 As coded by Walter (2002): pp.67-68;  
193 See Appendix for list of peace operations with no mandate to use force.  
194 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (n.d.): „What is peacekeeping?“ 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peacekeeping.shtml, last accessed 15.11.12.; same 
consideration is employed in Walter (2002): p.65. 
Weak 
Strong/ 
robust  
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missions under review, equally for UN and non-UN cases.195 Peace operations were 
identified from a recently published compilation which includes all peace operations from 
1946 till 2009.196 Considering only those cases where the conflict parties consented to the 
peace mission should preclude problems of legitimacy of the operation. Legitimacy, as 
outlined in Chapter 3.1, is important to ensure that a peace operation can provide credible 
commitment to the parties and function as a security guarantee.  
I am not exclusively focusing on UN peacekeeping operations, as it is done in many other 
works, since I am not assessing the purely normative effect of the missions.197 Some 
scholars have emphasized the common goal of UN missions to introduce liberal market 
democracies wherever they intervened.198 This ideological notion is, however, irrelevant 
for my categorisation which is based on the idea of how well these missions can enforce 
peace, i.e. how well can they provide security guarantees to ensure credible commitment 
of all parties and punish those who are not playing by the rules. The advantage of my 
approach lies in the fact that experts expect regional organisations to play an increasing 
role in peace operations in the years to come199, lately indicated by the passing of a 
Security Council resolution aimed at further institutionalising the cooperation with the 
African Union.200 The Democratic Republic of the Congo is only one example where the 
United Nations “were unwilling to get involved to any significant degree, leaving the 
peace processes to be pushed forward by regional actors and organisations.”201 Assessing 
the robustness of external security guarantees of regional organisations and their 
capability of serving as a credible guarantor of security necessary to reduce the stakes of 
a post-conflict election hence offers a relevant outlook for possible future developments.  
4.3 Inclusive Political Institutions (IV2)  
Following the theoretical considerations outlined, I consider the degree of inclusiveness of 
political institutions following the signing of a peace agreement, i.e. in the ‘transitional 
                                          
195 Bellamy and Williams (2005): p.158  find that there is no fundamental difference between UN and non-Un 
peace operations. 
196 Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2010): List of all Peace Operations 1946-2009 (UN and non-UN) 
http://www.polity.co.uk/up2/pdf/UP2_website_list_of_missions_19_Jan_2010.xlsx. last accessed 05.02.2013.  
197 My initial sample of 36 countries which experienced termination of a conflict through a CPA includes four 
cases which qualify for a non-UN peace operation: Tajikistan, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Burundi and Bosnia. 
198 Paris (2004).  
199 See Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze (2012): p. 16; http://www.zif-berlin.org/de/analyse-und-
informationen/veroeffentlichungen/weitere-zif-publikationen.html, last accessed 16.11.12 
200 United Nations (2012).  
201 Guttieri and Piombo (2007): p.30.   
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phase’ prior to the first post-conflict election, an important explanatory factor to elucidate 
the phenomenon of the recurrence of conflict following an election. 
The inclusiveness of political institutions has been highlighted as a main concern for 
durable peace.202 Territorial and military pacts will not be included in this analysis. The 
feasibility of territorial pacts in conflicts that were not fought over territory is rather 
low.203 Some scholars advise the implementation of territorial pacts only for homogenous 
territories.204 I will not focus on military pacts because elite cooperation, the core of 
Lijphart’s consociationalism, only focuses on political institutions. In line with Lijphart’s 
theoretical considerations as well as empirical evidence derived from other authors, I 
assume that all rebel movements will have high preferences to participate in the 
governing institutions, whereas a pre-arranged division of the military power is likely to be 
lower on a rebel movement’s list of priorities when it comes to the implementation of the 
peace plan and successfully concluding the transition phase.205  
This paper will focus on de facto and not de jure political institutions since I follow 
Lijphart’s belief that the experience of joint governance, and hence having the concrete 
possibility of having a say in political processes, is what prevents the reoccurrence of 
conflict in light of an election.206 It thus departs from the more common approach of 
Hoddie and Hartzell as well as other authors. The fact that nearly half of all peace 
agreements (43%) do not manage the transition from finding a compromise on paper, i.e. 
the peace agreement, to actually implementing the terms of the agreement, exemplifies 
the importance of investigating de facto institutional set-ups.207 Implementation is the 
linchpin because it demonstrates that the commitment to peace is credible, otherwise a 
return to the battlefield might be preferable. I argue that the potential exercise of power 
(as examined by those authors only looking at de jure institutions) is not enough in a 
setting where there has not been a prior period of shared power. Not considering the 
differences in implementation of CPAs might also explain why analyses which only look at 
de jure institutions at times conclude that political power-sharing is not associated with 
202 Discussion on this, including literature review in OECD (2011).  
203 Hartzell and Hoddie (2007): p.169. 
204 Vandeginste (2009): p.74 also argues this point.   
205 Walter (2002) Table 4.1, p.73. Walter argues that the resolution of a civil war is a three step process. For 
the last phase, the implementation of the terms of the treaty (and its endurance) she does not consider 
military pacts. 
206  Scholars who examine de jure institutions include Cammett and Malesky (2012): p.1010 and Hartzell and 
Hoddie (2003) and (2005a); Walter (2002). Jarstad (2009) and (2008) constitutes an exception. She codes 
cases as political power-sharing, where government and rebels experienced joint rule but does not 
differentiate between the degree of power-sharing. 
207 Walter (2002): p.6, Figure 1.2.  
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longer peace.208 While the problem of examining the true effects of political power-sharing 
is likely to be diminished by examining what has actually been implemented, we are still 
confronted with the problem of “operationalising some of the core concepts” and 
“establishing consistent institutional categorizations and reliable comparative evidence 
covering a wide range of countries”, resulting in only some of the concepts being 
examined.209 Although I have overcome the question of implementation, the latter 
criticism, not investigating all parts of consociationalism, is also a potential shortcoming of 
my work. I am trying to overcome this problem, by focusing on those aspects which 
gained the highest scores in an empirical investigation which centred on the question of 
reducing political violence in countries after conflict by the means of institutional 
guarantees, i.e. power-sharing, closely following Lijphart’s consociationalism.210   
I measure the inclusiveness of political institutions by examining the strength of two sub-
categories of Lijphart’s consociationalism, namely (A) Grand Coalition and (B) Proportional 
Representation.  
(A) Grand Coalition “should gather the leaders of all significant segments to govern 
together.”211 Viewed this way, it does not have to be the cabinet in a parliamentary 
system, but can also be the three-member rotating presidency in Bosnia, established after 
Dayton.212 This would, according to my Matrix 1 on p. 44 classify as A4.  
(B) Proportional representation on the other hand decides, broadly speaking, on the 
influence allocation in society.213 Proportional representation, typically associated with 
electoral systems, can take on different forms when employed in the transitional phase. 
Just looking at the sample from which my case studies are drawn, one can point to the 
CPAs in Angola in 1994 and 2002, which stated that “the first 70 deputies elected on the 
lists of UNITA candidates” [author’s note: as elected in 1992] (…) “shall constitute the 
UNITA parliamentary group.”214 Yet another way of achieving proportional representation 
in transitional government structures was experimented with in Iraq, where a transitional 
government was elected by proportional representation in January which governed until 
the transfer of power to a new government elected in December the same year. In South 
Africa on the other hand, all major political parties were to be represented in the 
                                          
208 Cammet and Malesky (2012) and Hartzell and Hoddie (2005a). 
209 Norris (2005): p.2.  
210 Binningsbø and PRIO (2005). 
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transitional government according to a proportional system.215 These examples indicate 
that there are manifold ways to apply proportional representation even during the 
transitional phase. The sharing of power is furthermore not restricted to one particular 
mode of governance, but can be achieved in a multitude of ways. In that sense, even a 
presidential system can exercise joint power, which empirically speaking is done as often 
as in parliamentary systems.216 
The scaling of (A) Grand Coalition and (B) Proportional representation is ordinal. Whilst 
the (B) Proportional Representation variable was already ordinal in Binningsbø’s work, I 
assigned the values for (A) Grand Coalition following empirical evidence derived from 
quantitative analysis according to which subdivision achieved the highest level of 
statistical significance in their regression analysis.217 
I presume that “the more political pacts, the better.”218 This accordingly means that the 
presence of no features is coded as 0, while all other categories are added together. This 
denotes, that a country in which (A 3) a ‘Coalition Cabinet’ (3 points) and (B 3) ‘Seats in 
the legislature allocated in a fixed quota’ (3 points) are observed, scores 6 points in total. 
A country which has on the other hand (A1) ‘No grand coalition’ (0 points) and (B 3) 
‘100% of the seats in legislature allocated by proportional representation’ (2 points) will 
score 2 points in total.  
 
                                          
215 Traniello (2008): p.36. 
216 Wolff (2008): p.6.  
217 Binningsbø and PRIO (2005): p.25  
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Case Studies Values A Grand Coalition  BProportional Representation   
A 1:no grand 
coalition 
  0 
    
A 2: a majority 
coalition cabinet 
  1 
   High 
inclusiveness 
of political 
institutions:6–
4  
A 3: a 
transitional coalition 
cabinet 
  2 
    
A 4: an agreement 
for 2 or more 
parties in the 
executive  
 3 
    
B1: no proportional 
representation  
 0 
    
B 2: between 50% 
and 99% of the 
seats in legislature 
allocated by 
proportional 
representation  
 1  
   Low 
inclusiveness 
of political 
institutions:3-
0 
B 3: 100% of the 
seats in legislature 
allocated by 
proportional 
representation  
 2 
 
    
B 4: seats in 
legislature allocated 
on a fixed quota  
 3 
    
 
 
Matrix 1 : Political Pacts 4 
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4.4 Summary and Prediction 
As I want to explore why post-conflict elections sometimes seem to trigger renewed 
conflict as oppose to precipitate demilitarisation of politics, I use the recurrence of 
violence following a national election as my dependent variable. I argue that the structure 
of the ‘transitional phase’ in which the electoral process is set exerts influence on the 
outcome of the latter. The insecurity of the process can be mitigated through robust 
external security guarantees (IV1) which help the parties to the conflict to overcome their 
mutual fears by monitoring their behaviour and punishing violations to the agreed upon 
terms. Inclusive political institutions (IV2) can address remaining grievances while at the 
same time demonstrating both parties that cooperation is possible and not detrimental. I 
would therefore expect that in cases where neither of my explanatory factors are present, 
a recurrence of violence is likely and might even occur prior to the culmination of the 
electoral process, i.e. the election itself. Furthermore, if the peace process breaks down it 
is further evidence that the mere prospect of an election in war termination is insufficient 
because those circumstances preventing elections taking place are also likely to be those 
which contribute to violence.219  
Accordingly, the following two hypotheses shall be tested in the subsequent empirical 
discussion: 
H 1: The more robust the external security guarantees, the less likely a recurrence of 
conflict following a national election. 
H 2: The more inclusive the political institutions following the signing of a comprehensive 
peace agreement (CPA), the less likely a recurrence of conflict following a national 
election. 
 
5. Methodology and Case Selection 
In order to test hypotheses derived from theory, one can either conduct an experiment or 
obtain conclusions through observation.220 Considering the obvious obstacles for 
experimental research in conflict studies, the hypotheses will be tested using case study 
analysis which complies with the logic of congruence. For congruence testing, "the 
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researcher tests whether the predicted value of the dependent variable, in view of the 
values of the case's independent variables, is congruent with the actual outcome in the 
case."221  
Small- N case studies have many advantages over large-N, purely quantitative studies, 
which currently dominate the conflict studies literature.222 As we know, correlation is not 
causation, and having a thick description of events can contribute to discovering the 
potential shortcomings of current models by testing data against good case studies.223 If 
case studies are employed to investigate findings from large-N or small-N data sets, they 
often do not go beyond a single case study or two.224 This paper on the other hand will 
ensure that more cases than variables are examined in order to not have more variables 
than cases and thus become a victim of the “small-N many variables” problem.225 
The Universe of Cases: Comprehensive Peace Agreements 
"A fundamental task in any research project is defining the universe of cases."226 I 
restricted my initial universe of cases, i.e. all countries that experienced intra-state 
conflict, to those which signed a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA). Countries 
included in the sample previously experienced “large-scale violence among geographically 
contiguous people concerned about possibly having to live with one another in the same 
political unit after the conflict.”227 This study defines a CPA as an agreement where the 
major parties in the conflict are involved in a negotiation process and those issues at 
heart of the underlying the dispute are included in the negotiation process. This does not 
mandate “that the exclusion of a few more outlying parties makes the agreement less 
‘comprehensive’ in nature.”228 
In order to establish which peace agreement qualifies as ‘comprehensive’ in nature, I 
relied on the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM).229 PAM is a project established in 2012 by the 
Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame and works 
closely with the renowned Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UPCD). The project was 
developed with support from the United States Institute of Peace and the National 
221 Bennett (2004): p.24. 
222 Paul Collier being the most notorious example of this. 
223 Keen (2012): p.8. 
224 Jarstad (2009); Jung (2012); Walter (2002). 
225 Peter (1998): p.65. 
226 Munck (2004): p.107. 
227 Licklider (1993): p.9. 
228 Vanderzee et al (2010). 
229 For the full definition employed by the Peace Accords Matrix, please refer to the Appendix to this paper. 
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Science Foundation.230 PAM codes peace agreements signed between 1989 and 2006 
qualitatively and monitors their implementation until the present date. This allows me to 
cross-check my own assessment with that of an established research team, which should 
in turn lead to more robust results since PAM employs a multi-step process for coding the 
material. 231Another advantage of using the PAM database is that it codes the CPAs 
according to which provisions were present and which ones were not, in addition to 
whether the provisions were in fact implemented. Singlehandedly reading and evaluating 
hundreds of peace agreements plus their subsequent execution would have been a nearly 
impossible challenge, which is why despite the complex forces underway during conflicts, 
conflict literature remains dominated by large-N country regressions.232  
5.1 Criteria for Case Selection 
Since this study adheres to the methodological principles of “Most Similar System Design” 
(MSSD) and applies the congruence procedure, cases will be chosen by the independent 
variable and “appear to be similar in as many ways as possible in order to control for 
'concomitant variation'”, so that “the factors that are held constant through the selection 
of cases cannot be said to be alternative sources of that relationship.”233 This will allow 
me to discount third-variable influence by creating “a semi-controlled environment that 
limits the effects of third variables by holding them constant.”234 
Cases are chosen by the independent variable, as oppose to the dependent variable, since 
the results from this method are more robust.235 The crux of cases chosen by the 
dependent variable is that you can only study what these cases have in common. From 
this follows, that the common denominators of the cases are mistakenly presumed to be 
"crucial antecedents of the outcome under investigation", despite other countries with a 
different outcome also fulfilling these characteristics, which in turn would make the 
hypothesis implausible.236 In order to test hypotheses, MSSD offers two different 
methods. Choosing as many different combinations of the variables as possible helps to 
test their relative strength. We can hence determine which proposed explanatory factor 
has the greater explanatory power.237 Since samples often do not allow for this type of 
                                          
230 PAM https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/about, last accessed 10.01.2013. 
231 PAM https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/faq, last accessed 10.01.2013. 
232 Blattman and Miguel (2010): p. 22 also criticise this fact. 
233 Peters (1998): pp. 37. 
234 Van Everra (1997): p.52. 
235 Ibid.: p.46.  
236 Geddes (1990): p.132. 
237 Ibid.: p.132.  
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testing without forfeiting the similarity amongst cases, it is also possible to “select cases 
with extreme values on the independent variable. Such cases offer strong tests, because 
the theory's predictions are certain and unique (...)."238 Additionally, this approach “lowers 
the numbers of third factors with the strength to produce the result that the test theory 
predicts which lowers the possibility that omitted variables account for passed tests.”239  
While MSSD applied in case study research certainly overcomes some of the caveats 
inherent in social science research, it is criticised for the oversimplification of reality, 
resulting in only limited explanatory value. It nevertheless is valuable for theory testing 
and to determine general tendencies.240  
5.2 Control Variables 
In the following section the two factors which are held constant throughout the study will 
be presented. While there are plenty of variables which tend to be held constant, authors 
are often not consistent in their estimation with the direction of the proposed effect.241 In 
line with the proposed importance of the role of the environmental context for conflict 
recurrence as outlined in Chapter 2.1, the paper will control for the two least disputed 
factors: the degree of economic prosperity (CV1) and previous regime type (CV2). 
One of the least disputed accounts within conflict studies is that “poor people fight 
more.”242 The ‘bottom billion’ continue to be stuck in a ‘conflict trap’, especially if they 
previously experienced a conflict, because the chances of development and increasing 
income become lower which in turn increases the chances for further conflict.243 As I have 
already discussed in Chapter 2.1, the greed and grievance perspectives have each 
advanced reasons why low-income countries have a certain pre-dispositions for 
experiencing violent intra-state conflicts compared to richer countries. Across the board, a 
rise in income is agreed to lower the chances for rebellion, whether this is due to greed or 
grievance. A case in point is that following a rise in income, translating in a decrease of 
infant mortality rate by 30 per cent, the Aceh Rebel Organisation in Indonesia 
238 Van Evera (1997): p.79. 
239 Ibid.: pp.52-3.  
240 Van Evera (1997): p.54. 
241 For example, Lijphart is inconsistent in his predictions for favourable implementation environments. 
Pointed out in Binningsbø (2005): p.10.  
242 Collier (2009); Gleditsch (2007). 
243 The term ‘bottom billion’ is most notably employed by Collier (2003). Refer to Collier (2007) for a 
discussion on the ‘conflict trap’, i.e. likelihood for conflict increases if a country previously experienced a 
conflict. 
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experienced recruitment problems for the period between 1976 and 1989.244 The 
expected effect is hence, that the lower the degree of economic prosperity, the more 
likely recurrence of conflict.245 I will use Gross National Income (PPP, in current US dollar) 
as my indicator for the degree of economic prosperity. Data was retrieved from the World 
Bank database.246 For each country, the year in which the CPA was signed was chosen as 
the basis for the figure quoted in Table 1 in the Appendix.   
Another variable that should be controlled for is previous democratic experience (CV2). 
The hypothesis, “the less democratic experience a country had previous to the conflict, 
the more likely is that elections cause a recurrence to violence” is generally agreed upon 
in the conflict studies literature and ‘one of the usual suspects’ when assessing why 
elections sometimes cause a renewed outbreak of violence in post-conflict countries.247 
The positive effect of democratic experience for the lasting chances of peace is related to 
the expectation that previous democratic experience is thought to lead to an 
internalisation of the democratic principles. This is primarily based on the ideas of Larry 
Diamond who poignantly wrote “over time, citizens of a democracy become habituated to 
its norms and values, gradually internalising them. The trick is for democracies to survive 
long enough – and function well enough – for this process to occur.”248 Once this has 
been achieved, democracy can be regarded as the dominant political culture. The benefits 
of an emerged democratic political culture include, amongst others, the “tolerance of 
opposition and dissent, trust in fellow political actors and a willingness to cooperate, 
accommodate and compromise.”249 We would therefore expect that any country which 
previously had democratic experience would have a lower chance for renewed conflict. In 
order to control for this phenomenon, we rely on the assessment of ‘democraticness’ by 
the Polity IV Index, as employed in previous studies measuring the degree of previous 
democratic experience.250 
After holding income (CV1) and previous democratic experience (CV2) constant, the initial 
sample of 36 cases classified as CPA’s by PAM from Africa, Europe, Asia and America 
respectively, has been reduced to 16. The 16 cases which qualified are listed in Table 1 in 
244 Walter (2004): p.375.  
245 Adapted from Roeder and Rothchild (2005a):p.45. 
246 World Bank, Data, Countries according to income classifications, http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-
classifications, last accessed 10.01.2013. Refer to Table 1 in the Appendix. 
247 Flores and Nooruddin (2012): p.558; also in Hartzel, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001): p.189. 
248 Diamond (1996) quoted in Walter (2002): p.29.  
249 Diamond (1996): 119.  
250 The variable can be divided into not democratic (-10 to -6), semi-democratic (-5 to 5) and democratic (6 to 
10). This classification has previously been employed by Binningsbø (2005) and Ellingsen (2000). Refer to 
Polity IV Index, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm, last accessed 05.02.2013.  
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the Appendix. In order to test the case selection of PAM for possible selection bias, I 
consulted compilations of CPA’s in order to ensure that a similar set of cases was included 
in other studies.251 The majority (8) of cases represented in Table 1 did neither have an 
implemented political pact during the transitional phase, nor a robust peace operation on 
the ground. Only 3 cases classified for having both inclusive political institutions and a 
robust peace operation. There are more cases where there is a strong security guarantee 
present but a political pact was not implemented (3) than vice versa (2).  
The sample does not allow me to test all combinations of values on my independent 
variables. There are only 2 cases which exhibit a low value on IV1, i.e. no robust external 
security guarantees, but a strong value on IV2, i.e. high inclusiveness of political 
institutions, both of which are with regards to other characteristics substantially dissimilar 
to the other cases within the sample.252 The danger of distorting my results outweighs the 
benefits of having a sample with all possible combinations of my independent variables. I 
will therefore use case studies which have the most extreme values on the study variables 
and are also with regards to other possible explanatory factors the most similar. As I am 
focusing with my IV2 on the distribution of political power, I will not examine cases fought 
over territory since other studies found that the means for peace-building differ between 
conflicts fought over government power and territory.253 
The cases to be examined are Djibouti (2001), Liberia (2003), Burundi (2003) and Sierra 
Leone (1996). They appear to be having similar characteristics with regards to other 
possible explanations for the recurrence of conflict following a national election (DV).  All 
countries experienced more than one episode of violent conflict and signed numerous 
peace agreements, prior to the CPA under examination in this paper. The conflicts prior to 
the signing of the CPA had a strong transnational component254 and classify as ‘new 
wars’, in that they were not driven by ideology.255 None of the countries have large export 
revenues resulting from refined petroleum products.256 All countries are located in ‘conflict 
251 The danger of selection bias was pointed out by Khosla (2004): p. 67. PAM data set (used in this paper) 
was compared with the cases mentioned in Wallensteen (2012) p.135 and Jarstad (2009) pp.52-3. 
252 Rwanda experienced genocide within the period under examination. Angola’s election took place after six 
years, compared to two in the other cases. Refer to Chapter 5.3 for the resulting problems of this. 
Furthermore it is one of the world’s largest oil producers. 
253 Authors have pointed out, that while conflicts fought over territory are able to, and indeed often do, 
introduce federalism, stakes are thus divisible. Refer for instance to Stedman (1997).  
254 One party to the conflict received support across its borders. Djibouti – Eritrea, Sierra Leone – Liberia, 
Burundi – Rwanda, Liberia – Guinea.  
255 Daley (2007): p.333.    
256 Data retrieved from US Energy Information Administration <http://www.eia.gov/countries/data.cfm>, last 
accessed 28.11.2012. 
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ridden neighbourhoods’ so-to-speak, increasing the risk for conflict spill-over.257 The 
conflicts prior to the signing of the CPA were relatively short, ranging from two to five 
years.258 Even though these factors are not employed as explicit control variables, the 
choice of my cases for comparison appears to be convincing because the cases are 
decisively similar with regards to other factors which one may expect to have an effect on 
the likelihood of conflict recurrence.259 
5.3 Discussion: Dynamic Timeframes for the Analysis of Violence and 
Elections 
Since the focus of my study is the recurrence of violence following a national election, the 
timeframe chosen will be the year in which the CPA was signed until the conduct of the 
first post-conflict parliamentary election. The timeframe is thus chosen in relation to my 
dependent variable, as already pointed out in Chapter 4.1.   
Comparable studies opt for a five-year timeframe, but the reasoning has some 
shortcomings.260 Jarstad thus writes that Angola did not experience a return to conflict 
within the five year period, since elections were only held six years after the CPA was 
signed. In fact, there was significant violence against civilians once the election took 
place, six years after the CPA was signed.261 The analysis thus fails to shed light on what 
it seeks to explain: violence in relation to elections.  
Hartzel, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001), who other authors refer to with regards to the 
timeframe, write that some of the effects of the conflict environment are likely to 
attenuate over time, hence a longer time frame could blur these developments. This 
criticism is particularly valid with regards to their investigation on the durability of 
settlements, using the two proxies previous regime type and the structure of the 
international system.262 Since my study holds these two factors constant, it should be less 
susceptible to potential distortions of this type.  
                                          
257 Related to diffusion theory. See Gleditsch (2002). 
258 PAM Country Comparison: Djibouti: 01 Feb 1998- 07 Feb 2000; Sierra Leone: 01.03.1991- 30.11.1996; 
Liberia: 01.01.2000- 17.06.2003; Burundi: 28.06.1998-02.12.2002. While ‘short’ is of course a relative 
assessment, the conflict episodes were decisively shorter compared to the civil war in Mozambique which 
started in 1977 and where the CPA was only signed in 1992 or the Philippines, where equally over two 
decades passed from the start of recorded violence until the signing of the CPA. See PAM: 
https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/matrix/country/, last accessed 25.01.2013. 
259 Walter (2002): p.109 equally writes, regarding the cases she chose to compare, that she chose them 
because they were as similar as possible out of all the cases of her sample.  
260 Refer to Jarstad (2009) and (2008). 
261 Compare: Jarstad (2009): p.54; Human Rights Watch (2012): p.4. 
262 This refers to my CV 2. All countries in the sample reached a settlement following the end of the Cold War.  
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The authors also caution that the effect of institutional arrangements is likely to change 
over time. As an example they give the effect of new grievances created through the non-
implementation of a settlement.263 Having this likely development in mind, I chose an 
approach which is able to account for that problem. I do not merely look at the ‘words’ of 
a CPA but also whether they are turned into ‘deeds’, namely whether the provisions were 
implemented. Furthermore, I examine the period from the signing of the CPA until the 
first elections, i.e. the transitional period. This approach recognises that the presence of 
the power-sharing provisions (IV2) set in place after the signing of a CPA is not finite, i.e. 
they may become a part of the constitutional set-up but they do not have to. By 
addressing the issue of implementation directly as part of my design, I will evaluate 
whether the resulting grievances were addressed and if not, whether that had an adverse 
effect with regards to the conduct of elections.   
Nevertheless we have to acknowledge that substantial in-sample variation of the duration 
until the first legislative election should be avoided, since the fading memories of conflict 
may make a recurrence of conflict less likely after ten years than after two.264 And indeed 
this seems to be the case. As many as 40 per cent of conflicts return within ten years 
back to war.265 
Since I explore whether the presence of my independent variables helps to answer the 
question why there is sometimes a recurrence of violence following an election, 
determining my cut-off point independent from the actual holding of the election will tell 
me little about the presumed peace inducing effect of my independent variables with 
regards to the insecurity caused by an election. In addition, the logic of my rationale is 
supported by the finding in Jarstad’s study that of the 22 countries where parliamentary 
elections were held, 17 slid back into conflict following the election.266 Considering the 
above refuted reasoning of sticking to a five year timeframe, I will determine the 
timeframe for each country according to the holding of its first post-CPA national 
legislative (parliamentary) election. If the electoral process broke down prior to the 
holding of an election, (see Chapter 2.2), the analysis stops at the breakdown of the 
peace process. This is compatible with the operationalisation employed by Jarstad, who 
for those cases where no elections took place in the by her defined five-year time frame 
263 Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001): p.187. 
264 Ibid., also pointed out in Collier (2009): p.74. 
265 Collier (2009): p.75. 
266 Jarstad (2008): p. 10. 
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she coded the recurrence of violence dependent on whether the country experienced one 
year of peace following the signing of the CPA.267 
 
Presence of the 
independent 
variables  
Country  Signing of the CPA 
Holding of the First 
Post-Conflict 
Elections 
Timeframe (in 
years) 
IV 1 and IV2 not 
present for the 
time under 
examination  
(-)* 
Djibouti 
Agreement for the 
Reform and Civil 
Concord , Mai 12 
2001 
2003 parliamentary 2 
Sierra Leone 
Abidjan Peace 
Agreement , Nov 30 
1996 
--------------------- 
Conflict breaks out 
anew during the 
electoral process 
IV1 and IV2 
strongly present 
for the time 
under 
examination  
(+)* 
Liberia 
Liberia Accra Peace 
Agreement, Aug 18 
2003 
2005 parliamentary 
(and presidential) 
2 
Burundi  
Pretoria Protocol 
November 2003  
2005 parliamentary 
(and presidential) 
2 
Source: Author’s own compilation. 
*plus and minus indicate that the cases had the highest and the lowest values on the study 
variables respectively out of my initial sample. 
 
Table 2: Case Selection 5 
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6. Empirical Test of the Model 
The model introduced so-far will be tested on four case studies, Djibouti (2001), Sierra 
Leone (1996), Liberia (2003), and Burundi (2003).  
6.1 Recurrence of Conflict Following a National Election    
As outlined in Chapter 4.1, my dependent variable is measured along an ordinal scale 
consisting of five indicators, each signifying a different degree of violence in relation to 
electoral conduct in my four post-conflict case studies. Prior to introducing the 
classification of the dependent variable for each case, a brief history of each conflict with 
respect to the history of political competition, the parties to the conflict and the signing of 
the CPA is presented.  
6.1.1 Djibouti (2001)  
The conflict in Djibouti can be divided into several stages, the two main episodes being 
characterised distinctively by grievances due to exclusion from the political arena.  
Djibouti is a former French colony, located on the Horn of Africa, surrounded by Ethiopia, 
Somalia and Eritrea. It is home to two main population groups, the Afar (ca.35 per cent, 
of Ethiopian descent) and the Issa (ca.60 per cent, of Somali descent). The relationship 
between the two groups was aggravated during colonial times when the French took 
turns in supporting one or the other of the ethnic groups.268 In 1977, Djibouti gained 
independence when 98 per cent of the population voted in favour in a referendum.  
The ‘first’ conflict episode lasted from 1991 till 1994. Tensions between the two majority 
ethnic groups started when a precursor of a multi-party system was introduced in 1991 
through constitutional reform with re-election of the parliament scheduled for the same 
year. “The new charter limited, however, the number of legally registered parties to a 
maximum of four and was not accepted by the Front for the Restoration of Unity and 
Democracy” (FRUD, Afar dominated) which boycotted the first multi party elections.‐ 269  
                                          
268 For information on the different episodes refer to Mesfin (2011): pp.1-2. 
269 Thibaut (1999): p.318. 
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FRUD was an amalgamation of opposition groups. At the end of 1991, the rebels 
commenced with attacks on the government army, feeling marginalised by the Issa 
dominated government and its political party Rassemblement Populaire pour le Progrès 
(RPP).270  In 1994, the government signed a peace agreement with the moderate faction 
of FRUD, which ended the first civil war in Djibouti. FRUD was registered as a political 
party the same year, as part of a power-sharing deal arranged in the peace accord, 
“Accord de paix et de la reconciliation nationale” from December 26 1994. Partially 
implementing the CPA, some of FRUD’s members were assigned cabinet posts in mid-
1995.271 
6.1.2 Sierra Leone (1996) 
As in the case with Djibouti, the conflict in Sierra Leone can be separated into different 
stages, namely a military regime followed by a civilian regime which was overthrown in 
favour of another military government.272  
Sierra Leone is situated in West Africa, bordering Guinea and Liberia. Great Britain 
established Sierra Leone 1787, when it became a haven for freed slaves. When Sierra 
Leone gained independence in 1961, there were some short-lived expectations that it 
would become “a model state”273, an assertion that was quickly to prove, unfortunately, 
wrong.  Whilst approximately sixteen ethnic groups reside in Sierra Leone, two are 
numerically dominant (the Temne, dominating the north of the country and the Mende, 
dominating the south. Each equal approximately 30 per cent).274 The British introduced a 
distinction between Creoles (British subjects) who were allowed “token representation in 
colonial institutions of rule” whilst natives (protectorate Africans) had no such 
representation until 1924.275 This exacerbated tensions between the politically dominant 
Creoles and the protectorate Africans, mainly Temne and Mende. 
The country’s first pseudo-competitive elections took place one year after independence 
in 1962, won by the Mende dominated Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP). In 1964, with 
the death of its founder and leader, the SLPP started to lose its grip on power, which 
270 Abdallah (2007): p.276. 
271 Five ministers were assigned cabinet posts; see PAM, 
<https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/matrix/status/48/powersharing_transitional_government>, Kroc Institute for 
International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame. Last accessed 28.01.2013.  
272 Refer to Accord (2000): p.89; www.c-r.org/accord-article/profiles-accord-sierra-leone, last accessed 
10.01.2013. 
273 Allen (1968): p.305.  
274 Kandeh (2004): p.128. 
275 Kandeh (1992): p.83.  
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incited some tensions and increased politics being played out along regional lines.276 What 
since independence been a relatively peaceful transition had changed dramatically by 
1967, when the country was shaken by its first coup d’état. The coup brought the 
northern-dominated All Peoples’ Congress (APC) to power in 1968 under the leadership of 
Sir Siaka Stevens, who declared the country a one-party state in 1978.277 The systematic 
oppression of any opposition resulted in the rule of the APC for 24 years.  
The conflict under examination in this paper first erupted in 1991, when pressure to 
reform the government structures mounted, leading to the adoption of a new constitution 
allowing for multiparty government rule.278 In April 1992 a coup disposed of the 
authoritarian APC leader Joseph Momoh, installing a military government, the National 
Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). Meanwhile a rebel group called Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF) started to gain strength and control over the territory.279 RUF’s particular 
strength was that it attracted the marginalised rural community across ethnic divisions.280 
Following massive demonstrations by the general population, the government conceded 
to allow the holding of a National Consultative Conference which demanded elections.281 
This led to the registration of political parties.282 One month prior to the election, a coup 
led by the NPRC’s defense minister ousted Strasser, the previous incumbent.283  
What can be regarded as the second phase of the conflict is when the Bio-led junta 
handed over power to the election winner Ahmad Kabbah, of the Sierra Leone People’s 
Party (SLPP), who won the legislative vote in March 1996 “overwhelmingly in the south 
and east of the country”, while losing in RUF’s stronghold in the north.284 At the same 
time, the Civil Defence Forces (CDF), a Mende dominated southern militia movement 
close to the government SLPP, started to become more active in its fight against RUF.285 
RUF meanwhile had done everything in its power to prevent people from casting votes, 
including carrying out horrific mutilations of civilians, while it itself boycotted the 
276 The split is between South and East; Kandeh (1998): p.92. 
277
 See Abraham (2000). 
278
 In a referendum in August 1991, 80 per cent voted in favour of constitutional reform. Refer to African Elections 
Database, Elections in Sierra Leone, africanelections.tripod.com, last accessed 10.01.2013.  
279
 Akam (2012). 
280 Dupuy and Binningsbø (2007): p.1. 
281
 Kaldor and Vincent (2006): p.6. 
282
 Kandeh (1998): p.95. 
283
 Dupuy and Binningsbø (2007): p.9.  
284 Accord (2000): p.86; www.c-r.org/accord-article/profiles-accord-sierra-leone, last accessed 10.01.2013. 
285 Ibid.: p.89. 
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elections.286 At least 27 people died in the run-up to the election, during which the conflict 
parties did not manage to agree on a ceasefire.287  
The election gave impetus to peace talks, starting with a ceasefire agreement the month 
after the election and finally cumulated in the Abidjan Peace Accord, signed on 30 
November 1996. The CPA was brokered under the auspice of several regional players 
(e.g. ECOWAS, the OAU, the Commonwealth and the London based conflict resolution 
NGO International Alert), while the UN’s involvement was limited.288  
Sierra Leone is thus slightly unusual with elections taking place prior to the existence of a 
CPA and a ceasefire agreement. As in the case of Djibouti, Sierra Leone also stuck to its 
previous electoral timetable and the next round of elections was supposed to take place in 
five years. As one scholar has written, “it is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that this 
experiment with democracy ended on 25 May 1997, when Kabbah was violently 
overthrown”, only six months after the signing of the Abidjan CPA.289 The conflict started 
anew in May 1997290 through the installation of the military government, the Armed 
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), a splinter group of the national army with the 
support of RUF.291  
FRUD started to support the incumbent RPP, hoping the party would fulfil the promise to 
finally implement measures for a greater distribution of power. 292 This accommodating 
sentiment was not shared by the whole rebel group since real concessions of power were 
awaited to no avail. This led to the creation of a radical faction of FRUD led by Ahmed 
Dini, subsequently referred to as FRUD-AD. The group continued to carry out violent 
attacks against the government with increasing frequency in 1998, which is regarded as 
the start of the second phase of the Djiboutian conflict. 
In 2001, a ‘final’ peace accord was signed, the Agreement for Reform and Civil Concord, 
incorporating FRUD-AD. The peace agreement did not alter the occurrence of elections in 
five year intervals. Although elections were scheduled for 2002 (having taken place prior 
to that in 1997), they had to be delayed for a few months until 2003. The first post CPA 
286 Fischer (2002): p.22.  
287 Harispe (1996): Polls close in Sierra Leone after at least 27 killed in related violence. 
288 It was only represented through a special envoy appointed by the Secretary-General, Berhanu Dinka from 
Ehtiopia.  
289 Malan, Rakate and McIntyre (2002): p.8. 
290 Refer to Peace Accords Matrix, Sierra Leone for the coding of violence start and end date. 
peaceaccords.nd.edu, last accessed 13.01.2013.  
291 Kandeh (1998): p.107. 
292 Brass (2008): p.535. 
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parliamentary/legislative election following the signing of the in Djibouti took place in 
2003.293 
As scholars have previously noted, empirical data for Djibouti is rare, despite Djibouti 
being one of the countries typically included in research endeavours in this field.294 It is 
thus difficult to judge whether the subsequent assessment with regards to the recurrence 
of conflict following a national election (DV) and my two independent variables is correct 
or marred by data shortcomings. In the following, I will assess the recurrence of violence 
in relation to the scale introduced in Chapter 4.1 for the national elections in 2003.  
NELDA has no violence recorded.295 In sum, violence following the parliamentary election 
did not take place despite allegations of fraud by the opposition.296 Research via 
LexisNexis did not reveal any further information.297 
6.1.3 Burundi (2003) 
As in the previously examined cases, the conflict in Burundi also occurred in several 
stages, characterised by intervals of alternating civilian and military rule, often as a 
precursor to or succeeded by violent conflict. 
Burundi is located in the East-African Great Lakes Region, bordering Tanzania, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda. Rwanda and Burundi were from 
1916 until 1962 a European Colony, first under German and subsequently under Belgian 
rule. Burundi is home to three ethnic groups, the Hutu (ca. 85 per cent), the Tutsi (ca. 14 
per cent) and the Twa (ca. 1 per cent).298 Colonial policies enforced the ethnic labels 
which favoured the minority Tutsis.299 Following independence in 1965, the 
instrumentalisation of ethnicity has, as in the other cases examined in this paper, led to a 
continuous struggle over either maintaining or capturing power, often along ethnic but 
also along regional lines.300  
Following independence in 1962, Burundi’s first election three years later brought a Hutu 
to power. Shortly after, the government was overthrown and a Tutsi-led junta established 
                                          
293 The government in Djibouti held onto to the electoral calendar which existed prior to the CPA. It thus held 
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294 Pointed out in Brass (2008): p.523.  
295 Refer to Appendix for Nelda Data. 
296 IRI/IFES (2005): p.3. 
297 Access via the library of Freie Universität Berlin. www.lexisnexis.com, last access 10.12.2012 
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a one-party state dominated by the Union pour le Progrès National (UPRONA). Two more 
episodes of violence occurred, in 1972 and in 1988, due to mutual fears of an attack from 
the other side, i.e. a classical security dilemma.301 Following the violence in 1988, a 
reform process aimed at ensuring Hutu inclusion in government was started by UPRONA’s 
leader Boyoa.302 Burundi’s first multiparty election in June 1993 was won by Melchior 
Ndadaye, representing the Hutu-dominated Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi 
(FRODEBU), who defeated Buyoya in a landslide victory.303 Subsequently, a peaceful 
transfer of power from the previously unchallenged UPRONA took place. Three months 
after Ndadaye took office, in October 1993, he was assassinated in a coup staged by the 
Tutsi-dominated military due to fear about increasing Hutu/FRODEBU power and “the real 
or imaginary prospect of an imminent reform of the armed forces.”304 This failed attempt 
to end the war meant that mistrust and tensions were high. As a consequence, the plane 
crash killing the Burundian president served as a spark that started a new chapter in the 
history of Burundian conflict in 1994.Three Hutu rebel groups, Conseil National pour la 
Décence de la Démocratie-Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD), Parti 
pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu Forces Nationales de Liberation (Palipehutu-FNL), and 
the Front pour la Libération Nationale (FROLINA) thus started their rebellion against the 
government.  
In the period between 1993 and 2003 many attempts were made to find a solution for 
lasting peace, which resulted in several episodes of peace in the country. In 2003, 
regional powers finally managed to pressure the CNDD-FDD to partake in negotiations for 
a new peace agreement, which was finalised in the Pretoria agreement.305 The agreement 
incorporated some of the same structures that had been agreed upon within the Arusha 
Accord from 2000, but included this time both rebel groups, thus classifying, following 
PAM, as a Comprehensive Peace Agreement.306  
After elections were initially scheduled for October 2004, they had to be postponed due to 
security concerns because the marginalised splinter-group FNL was still resisting co-option 
                                          
301 Ibid.: p.2. 
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into the transitional institutions and continued to carry out isolated violent acts.307 The 
legislative/parliamentary elections were held in July 2005 and brought the CNDD-FDD 
(Hutu) candidate Pierre Nkurunziza to power. This successful electoral process can be 
regarded as the culmination of the many previous years of violence.308  
This assessment of success is echoed when examining the NELDA database, which shows 
no violence recorded for the election, that was considered “free and fair” by international 
observes.309 Further research in the ACLED revealed, however, that fighting against the 
FNL continued and approximately 25 people died. 310 The fighting did not last longer than 
one day and was mainly concentrated in the capital. Research via LexisNexis did not 
reveal any further information.311   
 
6.1.4 Liberia (2003) 
Liberia has experienced several stages of conflict. The first was a one-party governance, 
followed by violent incidents, the inauguration of a warlord as a president, and a second 
major episode to the conflict, his overthrow followed by a period which is under 
examination in this paper. 
Liberia was established in 1820 and borders Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone. Like 
Sierra Leone, it was founded to resettle freed slaves, in this case by the US, the so-called 
Americo-Liberians. Liberia is home to as many as sixteen different ethnic groups.312 The 
Americo-Liberian elite which devolved from the resettlement behaved largely similar to 
their European colonial counterparts in their vast oppression of the indigenous 
population313, denying them Liberian citizenship until 1904 and voting rights until 1940.314 
Conflict over power was thus always fought against the privileged Americo-Liberians, 
which was effectively a one-party state until a coup d’état in 1980, bringing the first 
indigenous president Samuel Doe to power.315 Conflict had previously begun to mount 
due to grievances over economic deprivation, leading to violent protests.316 
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309 Refer to Appendix for Nelda Data. 
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Doe’s style of governance in which he favoured his own ethnic group, did not however 
differ to the previous governments with regards to the use of violence and discrimination 
against the remaining populous. Violence was used to oppress dissident voices and the 
civilian population, leading to several coup attempts, in an effort to remove Doe. In 
December 1989, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by the former 
government servant Charles Taylor, entered Liberia from neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire and 
started to dominate the border area. Gradually, the NPFL was able to take more and more 
control of the country, bringing Taylor to power and setting Liberia off on a track of 
violent conflict. When a transitional government was established in the early 1990s under 
the auspice of ECOMOG, the warring parties were explicitly excluded.317 Since the 
resulting interim administration was not able to forge permanent peace, another peace 
process (the Abuja Agreement 1995) was started, this time including Taylor and his party 
the NPFL, leading to Taylor’s electoral victory in 1997.318 Tensions started to mount again, 
leading to renewed incitement of the conflict in 2000 when Taylor’s opponents, the rebel 
group Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for 
Democracy and Elections in Liberia (MODEL), wanted to remove him by force.  
This second conflict (2000-3) was ended by the signing of a CPA in Accra (Ghana) in 
August 2003.319 The peace agreement, backed by a multitude of international actors such 
as the AU, ECOWAS, and the UN, has been said to differ largely with previous agreements 
in that it was mutually inclusive.320 The peace accord included a sunset-date for the 
transitional government and thereby stipulated elections to be held in late 2005 with 
power handed over to the elected government in early 2006.321  
As in the previous case studies, I consulted the ACCLED322, NELDA323 and LexisNexis324. 
There was no violence following the parliamentary election recorded, which took place on 
the same day as the first round of the presidential election.325 The same holds even when 
extending the time span to the inauguration of the new government in January 2006.326 
David Harris, an expert on Liberia, asserts that the largely cordial atmosphere that existed 
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between parties can be attributed to the political culture which evolved during the 
transitional government. 327 This aspect to the Liberian peace process will be discussed in 
the next chapter.  
Summary 
 
Timeline: Recurrence of Violence following National Elections Abbildung 6 
 
In Sierra Leone the move from violent conflict to war termination by an election failed 
dramatically. With a promised peacekeeping mission not materialising and relevant 
stakeholders to the conflict being excluded from government, it did not take long for war 
to resume. Despite similar preconditions as in Sierra Leone, the election in Djibouti went 
smoothly without violence against civilians occurring at any point during the electoral 
process. In Burundi, having achieved the challenge of implementing a highly complex and 
extensive political pact while benefiting from a peace operation, the election did not cause 
violence in itself, but the violence did not completely subside between a splinter rebel 
group and the government. Liberia can be regarded as the most successful out of the 
cases examined, with all favourable conditions present, the election took place peacefully.  
 
6.2 Robustness of External Security Guarantees (IV1) 
External security guarantees provided by an international peace operation are, as outlined 
in Chapter 3.1, presumed to provide the safe structural environment necessary for conflict 
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parties to move towards elections and thus war termination. This is, in part, due to their 
greater credibility and legitimacy compared to individual military actors. The cases under 
investigation experienced peace operations to a different degree. In Burundi and Liberia, 
there was a strong international presence both from the UN and regional actors, in line 
with the promise made when the respective peace accords were signed. In Djibouti, such 
promises never existed, whilst Sierra Leone is an example of the effects of a broken 
promise, i.e. promised security guarantees which failed to materialise. In the following 
discussion, the hypothesis that robust external security guarantees decrease the likelihood 
of conflict following a national parliamentary election will be examined by means of a 
comparative case study. 
6.2.1 Djibouti (2001) 
Whilst Djibouti is a relatively small country with national interest of one of the permanent 
members of the Security Council (France) - thus making it a likely case for intervention 
according to some of the theories outlined in Chapter 3.1 - it did not benefit from an 
international peace operation providing a safe structural environment conducive for the 
conduct of peaceful post-conflict elections. There as hence a 0 – No security guarantee 
for the period following the signing of the CPA in 2001 until the country’s first legislative 
parliamentary elections in 2003.  
Individual military actors played a decisive role in the Djiboutian conflict, however. The 
dynamic is quite different to a peace operation, however, because their involvement had 
not been agreed to by the conflict parties and they did not aim to create a context where 
credible commitment would become possible. Nevertheless it is necessary to consider 
their role at this point with regards to the impact on the lack of violence following the 
parliamentary election.  
The first individual military actor examined is the former colonial power France.328  Since 
1977, France has had the largest military base in the entire region, with approximately 
2,600 stationed military personnel in 2005.329 Its role in the Djiboutian conflict, and its 
contribution to non-materialisation of violence following the signing of the CPA, became 
apparent with regards to the second military actor with stakes in the struggle.  
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When the Ethiopean-Eritrean war broke out in 1998, Eritrea cut Ethiopia off from access 
to the port and thus its weapon supply. The Djibouti port then became the point of 
entrance for Ethiopian goods and weapons. Tensions increased when Eritrea tried to stir 
up the active, radical, FRUD-AD faction, which had its stronghold in the north of Djibouti, 
right at the border to Eritrea. This prompted France to increase its military presence in 
Djibouti and monitor the border to Eritrea, helping to deescalate the violence within the 
country and demonstrating readiness to act in support of the government. Eritrea’s victory 
over Ethiopia in 2000 ended Eritrea’s support of FRUD.330  
Further context for the implementation of the agreement was again heavily determined by 
Djibouti’s geographical position and resulting attention from the United States (US), the 
third noteworthy military power. When the CPA was signed in May 2001, no one could 
have expected that Djibouti would, within a few months, be the hot-spot for the fight 
against terrorism at the Horn of Africa. The Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa 
(CJTF-HOA) has since its beginning in 2002 “a semi-permanent troop presence at an 
enduring Forward Operating Site, Camp Lemonnier, in Djibouti with more than 2,000 U.S. 
military and civilian personnel in residence.”331 Both France and the US have thus 
significant military resources in Djibouti, including air craft carriers, ready to be deployed 
immediately. The US pays $30 million annually to the Djiboutian government for its 
access agreement to the camp, airport and port, which is topped up by an additional $30 
million annual rent paid by the French military forces.332  
France and the US both can be considered as actors, whose presence raised the cost of 
war (see Chapter 3.1) and are thus likely to have functioned as a deterrent for further 
violence, because it gave the Djiboutian government a comparative advantage.333 This 
was exemplified by France’s interception of Eritrea’s support to FRUD-AD. The Djiboutian 
government on the other hand had after 2001 increased financial means for repression. 
Djibouti has therefore an excessively large army, loyal to the government and comprised 
of approximately 100,000 men, compared to an overall population of 600,000 - 
900,000.334 The government “knows it has leeway to make demands or govern 
imprudently, counting on the US for backup or to turn a blind eye.”335 Eritrea on the other 
330 Bollee (2003): p.482. 
331 Ploch (2011): p.9. 
332 Brass (2008): p.526. 
333 Refer to Fortna (2008): p.86 on the “causal mechanisms of peacekeeping”. His point of “raising the cost of 
war” applies in this case, too. See Chapter 3.1.   
334 Bollee (2003): p.483. 
335 Brass (2008): p.526. 
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hand played a role in re-inciting the conflict, exemplifying why individual military actors 
and their self-interest often lack legitimacy and credibility in peace processes.  
6.2.2 Sierra Leone (1996) 
The security context in Sierra Leone following the signing of the Abidjan accord can be 
described as anything but a safe structural environment. This can in part be attributed to 
the missing credible commitment by international actors.336 That lack of commitment is 
indicative for the failure to deploy a Neutral Monitoring Group (NMG) from the 
international community, as had been stipulated by the CPA.337 Not only was the 
international community expected to provide a safety net via a peace operation, the UN, 
the OAU, the Commonwealth and Côte d'Ivoire were also expected to function as "moral 
guarantors" to the Accord, as prescribed in Article 28.338 The failure for the peace 
operation to materialise, however, makes this sound almost farcical. There were hence 0 
– No security guarantee for the period following the signing of the CPA in November 1996 
until the renewed outbreak of conflict and the coup d’état in May 1997.  
The former US ambassador to Sierra Leone during the conflict in the nineties, John 
Hirsch, asserts that the ‘lukewarm international response’ can be attributed to the 
perception “from outside the African continent as a small, strategically insignificant 
country”.339 Hirsch thus notes that the lack of national interest from a major power 
resulted in non-intervention, as expected according to the theory outlined in Chapter 3.1.  
The reasons for signing a peace accord differ to the reasons for its implementation, as 
noted in Chapter 1.3. Nevertheless one must make a connection between an important 
difference during the signing and during the failure to implement the Accord. The signing 
of the Abidjan Accord is said to have occurred thanks to the military strikes against RUF 
by the South African corporate mercenary force Executive Outcomes (EO), consequently 
arriving at a military stalemate between the two parties.340 Military stalemate is thought to 
be positively associated with the decision to sign an accord341, while conversely the re-
emergence of an unequal balance of power is associated with the recurrence of conflict.342 
The CPA, however, stipulated for EO to be withdrawn “five weeks after the deployment of 
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the Neutral Monitoring Group.”343 EO was withdrawn without another actor providing a 
minimal security context since the NMG was not deployed, leaving the government at a 
decisively weaker position than prior to the signing of the Accord.344 
The lack of any military presence, and even more so the broken promise of international 
commitment, arguably gave the rebels the space needed to plan another military strike, 
without fear of the immediate consequences of international action and without anyone 
there monitoring their actions, – or those of the other conflict parties.345 One can thus 
conclude that the non-existence of a security guarantee is an important explanatory factor 
with regards to the breakdown of the peace process and renewed war, prior to even the 
conduct of elections.346 
6.2.3 Burundi (2003) 
Like the two previous cases, Burundi has also been plagued by previous incidents of 
violent conflict without this resulting in the deployment of a peace operation. 
Nevertheless, Burundi presents quite a different scenario compared to Djibouti and Sierra 
Leone. 
The peace operation in April 2003 was not just a novelty for Burundi, but also for the AU. 
The African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB), equipped for the first time in the history of 
the AU with a robust mandate and was deployed with authorisation of the Security 
Council, prior to the signing of the Pretoria Protocol in November. AMIB’s early presence 
thus provided the parties with a clear representation of the AU’s commitment to the peace 
process, while enjoying legitimacy and credibility from the conflict parties. As had been 
defined in the CPA, AMIB was primarily tasked to verify and monitor the ceasefire. 
Nevertheless its presence constituted a deterrent to violence, due to its robust 
mandate.347 In its initial stage, more than 900 troops had already been deployed and the 
mission soon rose to its full capacity of 3,250 military personnel.348 It had been agreed 
that AMIB was to be integrated into an UN mission, once its one-year mandate expired. 349 
This is, as in the case of Liberia as we shall see, an example of increasingly used 
sequential peace operations.  
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AMIB’s impact on the ground has to be assessed twofold. Firstly with respect to my 
argument that external security guarantees provide a safe structural environment and 
secondly, that they give a credible commitment to the parties that they will not tolerate 
violence from, or against, the conflict parties. Violence did not subside completely since 
the breakaway faction FNL (not included in the CPA, see Chapter 6.1.3) continued its 
attacks, also against civilians, throughout 2004.350 At the same time, “the AU troops 
protected leaders returning to the country, so that they could take part in the peace 
process and eventually help form a government.”351 Without this protection and the 
politicians’ subsequent return to Burundi, the CPA implementation process and the 
success of the planned elections would have been jeopardised. Without their return and 
the joint exercise of power prior to the election, mutual mistrust between the former 
warring factions is likely to have persisted.352 Overall, AMIB can be regarded as having 
contributed significantly to the peace process in Burundi, particularly by showing their 
continuous commitment and support to the peace process. Furthermore, without AMIB 
implementing the groundwork, the UN is unlikely to have come in with such a great 
capacity and as many as 2,612 AMIB troops formed the first contingent of the UN force.353  
The United Nations Mission to Burundi (ONUB) arrived in June 2004, two months after the 
UN received the assessment mission report. At its peak, it had 5,650 military personnel as 
authorised in its mandate, which is in line with the request made by the assessment 
mission.354 Once the mission had been authorised, it was a “rollout very much in the spirit 
of the Brahimi Report’s call for ‘rapid and effective deployment’.”355 As agreed upon in the 
peace accord, the UN mission monitored the ceasefire, assisting in tasks related to 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration and ensuring protection of civilians and 
institutions.356 
Overall, AMIB and ONUB both played their part in providing a secure environment and re-
assuring both conflict parties. In particular, the decrease of violence exercised against 
civilians in the year of the election and its aftermath is an indicator that this contributed to 
transforming the context under which the elections took place. For the larger part of the 
period prior to the first parliamentary post-conflict election in Burundi, more than 5,000 
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armed peacekeepers were present, making it a very robust external security guarantee 
(Level 5). 
6.2.4 Liberia (2003)  
Whilst Liberia is the only case in this paper where peace operations were deployed during 
earlier conflict episodes, the attributes of the peace operation safeguarding the Accra 
Peace Agreement in 2003 were vastly different.357 As a consequence, many scholars point 
to UNMIL with regards to the success of peace following the elections in 2005.358 In the 
following I will assess how UNMIL affected the dynamics of the conflict so that the 
legislative election became a symbol for war termination rather than re-incitement of 
conflict. 
The United Nations Mission to Liberia (UNMIL) was at the time of deployment the largest 
ever UN mission, with up to 15,000 personnel on the ground.359 This is no comparison to 
the meagre UN mission UNOMIL (1993-1999), which had at its peak 300 personnel and 
no mandate to use force.360 In addition, the approach to keeping the peace in Liberia was 
guided by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s statement, that “the United Nations 
and regional organizations should play complementary roles in facing the challenges to 
international peace and security.”361 This was realised through using the synergies from 
an upfront-deployed ECOWAS force (ECOMIL), making it another example of a sequenced 
peace operation. 
ECOWAS already deployed its 1,500 peacekeepers while the peace process was still 
ongoing in July and had deployed 3,500 once the Accord was signed. The agreement 
stipulated that ECOMIL troops would be integrated into UNMIL, once the latter was ready 
to be deployed, as part of “an interlocking three-phase deployment.”362 Two weeks after 
the signing of the CPA, the Security Council issued a resolution for the deployment of 
UNMIL, which was readily implemented. The UN personnel were deployed according to 
the set timetable and had a Chapter VII mandate, i.e. a mandate to use force, as had 
been determined in the CPA.363  
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UNMIL had, in October 2004, the chance to prove its potency as deterrent of violence and 
proving its commitment to the Liberian peace process when riots broke out. UMMIL 
reacted by increasing the presence of helicopters and clamping down on violence leading 
to a cessation of the riots.364 This can be compared with the example given for Djibouti, in 
which the French troops condoned the cross border attacks from Eritrea and proved their 
readiness to act as a deterrent to the violence (albeit clearly siding with one conflict 
actor). 
With regards to the assessment of the nature of the external security guarantee, the UN 
and ECOWAS deployment should be counted as one guarantee, since the integration of 
the troops of the regional force took place under the umbrella of the UN and the 
approach had been designed by both parties. This made the peace operation an 
exceptionally strong deterrent: not only had the UN shown its continuous commitment to 
the peace process since the start of the negotiations in 2003 through assessment 
missions and the subsequent deployment, but this was also backed up by an experienced 
regional actor, namely ECOWAS.   
In spite of the undeniable success of the external security guarantee under investigation, 
we should end on a cautionary note. Despite nearly ten years having passed since the 
signing of the Pretoria Protocol, UNMIL remains with a large presence in Liberia (currently 
9,000). UNMIL is planned to be downsized “to about 3,750 personnel by July 2015.”365 
Doubts have been raised as to how the security situation will develop, once the 
peacekeepers leave. 366  
6.3 Inclusiveness of Political Institutions (IV2) 
Considering the fierce criticism that has been made by some scholars with regards to the 
long-term effects of installing power-sharing, it is interesting to note that nearly all 
countries of the sample rejected power-sharing following the end of the transitional 
phase.367 Burundi presents an exception here, with among other features, its 
constitutionally mandated 60-40 per cent split between Hutus and Tutsis still being 
364 Nilsson and Kovacs (2005): p.403. 
365
UNMIL Facts and Figures, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmil/facts.shtml, last accessed 
26.12.2012. 
366
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367 Refer to Chapter 3.2.  
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practiced.368 Other authors have previously noted that in the case of Burundi and Liberia, 
at least the short-term impact of power-sharing appears to have been very positive in 
reconciling the conflict parties.369 The two cases thus highlight that making concessions of 
political power prior to the first post-conflict election is seen as a costly signal of 
commitment.370 Djibouti and Sierra Leone, on the other hand, are both extreme cases of 
lack of an institutional guarantee. 
6.3.1 Djibouti (2001) 
The peace agreement which ended the first phase of the conflict in Djibouti stipulated 
FRUD’s rebel-to-party transformation, including the fact that it should be involved in the 
management of the country.371 Whilst this did not lead to power being exercised jointly, 
the Agreement for Reform and Civil Concord from 2001 did not even continue the 
window-dressing of establishing inclusive political power-sharing institutions. 372  
The CPA did not directly address the question of political institutions, although it allowed 
for an opening of the political system as such. The limitation of only four political parties, 
as stipulated by Article 6 of the Constitution of September 1992 was to expire on 3 
September 2002, clearing, at least theoretically, the way for multiparty political 
competition.373 A limitation nevertheless remained with regards to the fact that all “parties 
would be recognised, subject to approval by the Interior Ministry.”374 The approval by the 
Interior Ministry has in some cases only happened after a delay. Registration to 
participate in an election is furthermore tied to an extortionate registration fee for a 
country classified as low income, which equals $28, 500.375 
The peace agreement did not work as stimulus for reshuffling the government. Members 
of FRUD-AD waited in vain to be assigned some government posts.376 The transitional 
government thus consisted of the same politicians as prior to the conflict, where the 
exclusion of the Afar, represented by FRUD-AD, had incited the second phase of the 
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conflict in Djibouti. It still held true that “in Djibouti, there is very little distinction between 
the ‘government’ and the majority coalition, which are de facto one and the same.”377 The 
question of ‘who governs’ was thus still answered in the same way as it was prior to 
conflict. The incumbent coalition (dominated by the Issa) had been ‘winning’ every seat in 
every ‘election’ since 1977.378  The president thus continued to concentrate all state 
power in the executive through continuing to limit the powers of the National Assembly, 
which is nominated by the president.379  
The elections in Djibouti have always been contested by the opposition who accused the 
government of fraud. 380 As outlined in Chapter 3, fraud is a common tactic used by the 
challenged elites who still have control over the state apparatus. Whilst the continuity of 
political exclusion through non-democratic means often leads to violent opposition from 
rebel groups and the population, this was not the case in Djibouti. One analyst ascribed 
the lack of protests to growing apathy over “the way things are done.”381 The lack of 
protests is nevertheless surprising, considering that the demands of FRUD-AD always 
centred on participation in the political institutions.382 
Following the signing of the CPA in Djibouti, not much had changed with regards to the 
political landscape. Grievances of FRUD-AD and the Afar population had been addressed 
no more than at any other point in the history of Djibouti since independence. Djibouti 
had exceptionally low inclusion of the opposition on all levels of government for the 
period examined.   
6.3.2 Sierra Leone (1996) 
The state of political institutions in Sierra Leone following the signing of the CPA bare 
some similarities with those in Djibouti, albeit the outcomes with regards to the 
recurrence of violence were very different.  
As in the case of Djibouti, the government elected in 1996 remained in power and the 
CPA did not include provisions for political power-sharing. The RUF leader Sankoh claimed 
that he had been promised “the position as vice president”, which was denied by the 
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government.383 Whilst the political opposition in Djibouti was not included in the post-
conflict government due to the incumbent government still exercising control over the 
state apparatus and in silencing opposition, the RUF were not represented since they 
boycotted the election in 1996 and the CPA did not aim to create greater inclusiveness. 
The Abidjan agreement mandated the inclusion of RUF into the political system and thus 
prescribed the registration of RUF as a political party within thirty days of the signing of 
the CPA.384 This did not occur prior to the renewed outbreak of fighting.385  
Proportional representation, creating inclusive decision-making bodies with members from 
all parts of society is as outlined in Chapter 3.2 regarded as one of the most important 
mechanisms for addressing potential grievances and inducing a feeling of security. The 
agreement contained no government office which mandated any specific share of power 
between the conflict parties.386 Some scholars argue, however, that one provision within 
the Abidjan accord, namely the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace could have, to 
some extent, resembled Lijphart’s grand coalition, since the joint commission should have 
held some coordinating power, albeit no decision making power.387 The CPA specified that 
the RUF and the former government of Sierra Leone ought to both be represented within 
the commission, without specifying the share of power between the two.388  The 
Commission was tasked with a number of coordinating measures, but none of them 
concerned political provisions. While four RUF members and four members close to 
Kabbah were appointed in late November, they never took up their work.389 The lack of 
real power held by groups opposing the government can be regarded as important factors 
with regards to the non-implementation of the only provision which could have aided in 
addressing grievances and supporting reconciliation. 
“The people had fought for democracy but never got it”, said the spokesman of the 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC).390 The de facto complete lack of institutional 
guarantees addressing any potential grievances marginalised groups and the RUF could 
have had is regarded as one of the explanatory factors for the breakdown of the Abidjan 
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agreement.391 On the eve of signing the Accord, a UN research analyst wrote, with 
regards to the lack of inclusive political institutions encouraging cross- ethnic cooperation: 
"having some of the major political parties that draw their support from certain parts of 
the country exclusively in the opposition is likely to make the next elections another life 
and death matter."392 The lack of concessions to RUF during the transitional phase is 
consequently a likely contributor to the outbreak of violence and subsequent coup d’état 
even before new elections took place. 
6.3.3 Burundi (2003) 
The CPA under examination in this study was not the first time that power-sharing 
features were attempted in Burundi. Particularly early on the in the peace process, these 
agreements were not inclusive and only occurred at an elite level without dialogue with 
the rebel groups.393 The process after 2003 has been described as closely institutionalising 
Lijphart’s model of consociationalism and offering ground for some optimism in the merits 
of the model.394 These potential merits with regards to the achieved inclusiveness of 
political institutions and the effect this had in addressing the security concerns of the 
groups during the heightened insecurity of the election in 2005 will be examined in the 
following discussion.  
The Pretoria Protocol stipulated that the transitional institutions should be “a transitional 
legislature made up of a National Assembly and a Senate, a transitional Executive, a 
Judiciary and other transitional institutions as set forth in the present Protocol.”395 This 
was assessed by PAM as having been implemented successfully.396 What had been agreed 
upon in 2003 was an extension of the Arusha Agreement of 2000, which failed to include 
all significant parties of the conflict. In order to rectify this and make the transitional 
government an attractive option for commitment for the rebel group CNDD-FDD, further 
power-sharing mechanisms were added into the executive branch, an option which, 
notably, was not applied in Sierra Leone.397  
With regards to the inclusiveness of the executive, the agreement stipulated that along 
with the president there should be two vice-presidents, belonging to different ethnic 
                                          
391 Dupuy and Binningsbø (2007): p. 13.  
392 Bangura (1997): p.69. 
393 Bah and Jones (2008): p.11. 
394 Lemarchand (2006): p.1.  
395 PAM, https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/matrix/status/45/powersharing_transitional_government, Kroc Institute 
for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame. Last accessed 15.01.2013.  
396 Ibid.  
397 Vandeginste (2009): pp.78-9.  
                                                                          Laura Wolfs: Democrazy?! 
 
72 
groups and parties. Additionally (as agreed in 2003, making for an essential difference 
compared to 2000) there was to be a Minister of State on whom the decisions of the 
president would hinge. This became the leader of the former rebel movement CNDD-FDD, 
Pierre Nkurunziza.398 
The legislature was to consist of a transitional National Assembly and a Transitional 
Senate. The National Assembly was to be composed of members who were elected in 
1993. Other parties, not represented in the grand coalition, would take up the vacant 
seats. Civil society actors should also be included. At the same time, the composition of 
the National Assembly was required to be 60 per cent Hutu and 40 per cent Tutsi.399 The 
Senate was announced by the National Assembly and the president with consideration of 
the ethnic, regional and political balances. Furthermore, it prescribed the participation of 
former heads of states and, aside from the prescriptive Hutu and Tutsi participation, also 
guaranteed three seats for the Twa ethnic group. Within these elements, the question of 
proportionality was addressed. “The government shall include representatives of different 
parties in a proportion whereby more than half and less than three-fifths of the portfolios 
are allocated amongst the G-7 group of parties [authors note: predominantly Hutu 
Parties].”400  
The Pretoria Agreement additionally stipulated that the relevant ethnic group does not 
have to belong to a party associated with the dominant group, resulting in parties having 
to seek appeals across ethnic lines and creating cross cutting cleavages. This, in 
particular, stalled the implementation process initially. The Tutsi-dominated UPRONA felt 
threatened by the provision that Tutsis from a predominant Hutu party could take up 
seats in the transitional government.401 As a consequence, the CNDD-FDD boycotted its 
participation in the transitional government for one month between April and May 2004 
because it accused the government of being too slow in its integration into government 
structures.402 The government distributed the agreed-upon posts to CNDD-FDD and 
officially registered it as a political party. Once this was done, CNDD-FDD returned to the 
transitional government.403 
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When the Arusha Peace Accord from 2000, during which no ceasefire was in place, was 
transformed into a CPA due to the participation of CNDD-FDD in 2003, and during its 
subsequent transformation into a political party in 2004, violence subsided majorly. As 
one scholar asserts, “by and large, when measured against the objective of war 
termination, the use of power-sharing can – so far – be considered to be a success story 
in the case of Burundi.”404 The fact that the former Hutu rebel movement CNDD-FDD won 
the 2005 elections and this did not result in a renewed outbreak of violence certainly 
testifies that the trial period of sharing power significantly reassured the minority Tutsi. 
Secondly, the design of the political system created cross-cutting political cleavages prior 
to, and after the elections. The Pretoria Protocol and the resulting government thus 
fulfilled all the objectives of consociationalism: it instilled a culture of elite cooperation 
amongst all segments of society which addressed group grievances and served as a 
reassuring signal to all parties.  
6.3.4 Liberia (2003) 
As in the case of Burundi and Djibouti, the Accra Peace Agreement was not the first 
attempt at implementing some form of power-sharing. The previous attempts had failed, 
however, in encouraging cooperation but rather exacerbated tensions between different 
parties.405 
The game started to change in 2003. In October, the National Transitional Government of 
Liberia (NTGL) was set up, in accordance with the CPA. The Peace Accords Matrix 
commends the inclusive nature of the transitional government and the absence of 
violence in the implementation process. Aside from some problems in late 2003, the 
process was relatively smooth and the allocation of positions for the NTGL was completed 
in early January 2004.406  
The inclusiveness of the political process in the NTGL was manifested within both the 
executive and legislative branch of government.407 The executive consisted of a president 
and an appointed cabinet approved by the Senate. The transitional coalition cabinet was 
set-up for which “the individuals (…) were nominated by the parties to the peace 
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agreement and confirmed by the Assembly.”408 The formerly armed factions were thus 
able to choose their own ‘safety-nets’, while the joint exercise of power was aimed to 
install moderation. According to Rothchild, the rebel movements LURD and MODEL feared 
that moderation resulting from cooperation would decrease power over their militia.409 
They were therefore at first reluctant to cooperate. This was, however, overcome in due 
time. The only restriction which was placed on the executive structure of government was 
that “no representative of a warring faction could hold the position of chairman or vice-
chairman in the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL).”410 This provision 
could have, under different circumstances, been a source of tension since it excluded the 
possibility of a senior figure of one of the rebel movements taking up an ‘appropriate’ 
position. A factor which many regard as the ground stone for post-conflict peace is that 
Taylor, the leading figure of the rebel movement NPFL, had already left for exile in Nigeria 
several months prior to the inauguration of the NTGL and thus was not able to disrupt the 
peace by demanding a top-level position, which could have led to renewed conflict, as it 
did following his presidency in 1997.411  
The legislative branch of government was organized as a unicameral National Transitional 
Legislative Assembly, for which the posts were allocated according to a fixed quota.412 
The three former conflict parties (GOL, LURD and MODEL) each received 12 seats, while 
other political parties obtained 18 seats and the 15 seats, whilst civil society counties 
were allocated 7 seats.413 Particularly the inclusion of civil society actors has been 
applauded, since it made the NTGL truly representative of all segments of society in the 
Lijphartian sense. 
408 Ibid.: p.18. 
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6.4 Assessing the Validity of the Model – Interaction of the Variables    
 Djibouti (2001) Sierra Leone (1996) Burundi (2003) Liberia (2003) 
DV: Recurrence of 
Conflict following a 
national election 
(in countries where 
a conflict was 
ended through a 
CPA) 
No recurrence of 
conflict following a 
national election 
 
Breakdown of the peace 
process and installation of a 
military junta before 
elections could be held. 
No recurrence of 
conflict following a 
national election 
The rebel group FNL 
continued sporadic 
attacks and was fought 
by the government. 
No recurrence of 
conflict following a 
national election.  
IV 1 : Degree of 
Robustness of 
External Security 
Guarantees 
No external security 
guarantees (0) 
But likely influential 
presence of French and 
American troops. 
 
No external security 
guarantees (0) 
International presence had 
been promised but did not 
materialise, while private 
security company was 
withdrawn.  
Very robust external 
security guarantees 
(5) 
AMIB and ONUB both 
had mandates to use 
force and succeeded in 
decreasing violence 
against civilians.  
 
Very robust external 
security guarantees 
(5) 
ECOWAS troops present 
during the talks, 
subsequently integrated 
into one of the 
strongest UN missions 
to this date. 
IV 2 : Degree of 
Inclusiveness of 
Political Institutions 
(following the 
signing of the CPA) 
Low inclusiveness of 
political institutions  
Government structures 
remained unaltered 
after the signing of the 
CPA, only a ban on a 
limitation of four parties 
was lifted  
(A1 and B1 = 0) 
Low inclusiveness of 
political institutions  
RUF and other minor parties 
were not included in the 
interim government 
structures, CPA prescribed 
joint committee which never 
started its mandate  
(A1 and B1 = 0) 
 
High inclusiveness of 
political institutions  
Power-Sharing was 
present in both the 
executive and 
legislative transitional 
institutions  
exemplified by 
• executive: 
president, two 
vice presidents 
and a Minister of 
State (A4) 
• transitional 
legislature: seats 
allocated 
according to a 
quota (B4) 
(A4 and B4= 6) 
High inclusiveness of 
political institutions  
Power-Sharing was 
present in both the 
executive and 
legislative transitional 
institutions 
exemplified by 
• executive: 
president and 
cabinet (A4) 
• transitional 
legislature: seats 
allocated 
according to a 
quota (B4) 
(A4 and B4= 6) 
Source: Author’s own compilation. 
Table 3 – Interaction of the Variables 7 
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7. Conclusion 
7.1 Summarising the Evidence 
My first hypothesis, that the more robust the external security guarantees, the less likely 
a recurrence of conflict following a national election, was partly confirmed. In Sierra 
Leone, violence broke out in the absence of a robust security guarantee, thus confirming 
the hypothesis by implication. In Liberia and Burundi on the other hand a positive 
relationship existed between robust external security guarantees and absence of violence 
following a national election. Djibouti on the contrary does not confirm the hypothesis. 
Potential reasons for this will be elaborated below.  
My second hypothesis, the more inclusive the political institutions following the signing of 
a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA), the less likely a recurrence of conflict following 
a national election can also be regarded as partly confirmed. Again, Sierra Leone, Burundi 
and Liberia portray the expected relationship whilst Djibouti disconfirms the hypothesis.  
Overall, one can conclude that my two explanatory variables were able to transform the 
context in which the electoral process was set into an environment conducive to the 
conduct of elections, as exemplified by Burundi and Liberia. The implementation of 
inclusive political institutions (IV2) and additional mechanisms for monitoring and 
sanctioning through the presence of a peace operation (IV1) during the transitional period 
can consequently both be regarded to function as costly signals that the conflict parties 
are ready for a break with the past. The election was hence able to fulfill its war 
terminating function because the context in which it was held provided the necessary 
reassurance to the parties. The case study on Sierra Leone, where neither of my 
explanatory variables was present, on the other hand showed, that the lack of these 
security inducing factors increased the incentives to return to war. At the same time, 
Djibouti highlights the limitations of my model with regards to other possible factors for 
explanation since in this case both of my hypotheses were not confirmed but no 
recurrence of conflict following the election occurred. 
For Djibouti, the analysis showed, that while no robust external security guarantees were 
present to ensure a safe environment for the implementation of the agreement, it is 
impossible to disregard the effect the strong French and US military presence must have 
had (and must still have) on the capacity of the incumbent government. This is likely to 
have led to a distortion of my results, leading to a disconfirmation of my hypotheses. For 
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one, the military presence on the ground had previously sided with the government and 
thus the rebel forces were in a significant disadvantage regarding their capacities for 
rebellion. Secondly, the Djiboutian government was close to bankruptcy and the IMF 
refused to pay any more credit, when the events of 9/11 turned Djibouti into the base for 
the fight against terrorism which gave rise to sudden, new government income.414 Whilst 
grievances were not addressed through the experience of joined governance prior to the 
election, it is likely that conflict did not recur because of the capacity of the government 
to silence opposition, partly enabled through the rents from both the American and the 
French military.  Thus, no recurrence of conflict occurred despite in all likelihood electoral 
fraud having taken place, which I would have expected to serve as an incentive for 
mobilisation to occur (refer to Model 1). The implications this has on further research will 
be addressed in Chapter 7.2.   
The case of Sierra Leone, where equally neither of my explanatory factors was present, 
paints a very different picture compared to Djibouti. Fortna, citing the Sierra Leone expert 
David Keen, writes that the persisting “spiral of mistrust between the RUF and the Civil 
Defence Forces (CDF)” was “largely responsible for the failure of the Abidjan 
agreement.”415 This mistrust proliferated through the failed deployment of a peacekeeping 
force and the lack of inclusive government institutions for RUF and other marginalised 
groups. The experience in Sierra Leone thus corresponds to the scenario described in 
Variant a in Model 1, where a marginalised group felt threatened and conflict erupted 
while the shadow of an election was still looming, i.e. conflict broke out anew during the 
electoral process. Thus, the lack of institutional and structural guarantees resulted in a 
continuously high insecurity context where grievances were not addressed.416 This 
process was accelerated by a sudden change in the comparative balance of power of RUF, 
when the private-security-company EO, fighting for the government, was withdrawn. 
From that follows that the military stalemate, which set the conditions for cooperation, 
was resolved (Chapter 2.1). Thus, in the absence of security inducing factors, RUF once 
again had the military means to strike back pre-emptively, while no external security 
guarantee monitored or sanctioned its behaviour. 
                                          
414 Bollee (2003): p.483. 
415 Fortna (2008): p.151.  
416 Kaldor and Vincent (2006): pp.9-10.  
                                                                          Laura Wolfs: Democrazy?! 
 
78 
7.2 Criticism and Outlook 
In order to limit distortion of my results through third variable influence I did not test all 
possible variable combinations. Hence, I unfortunately cannot draw any conclusions at 
this point on which of my two explanatory variables proved to be more important with 
regards to preventing the recurrence of violence following an election. Further 
comparative research is hence needed. 
Multicollinearity should in any case be avoided because it distorts the finding of the 
relationship of the independent variables with the DV. The combination of my two study 
variables could be suspected to be prone to this, since a peace operation may be more 
likely to be deployed if the presence of political pacts is assessed as a sign for the actors’ 
commitment to peace, and vice versa, conflict parties may be more likely to implement 
the pact when a peace operation has been deployed.417 In a study on the successful 
implementation of peace agreements and subsequent peace, Walter ran a regression 
analysis where security guarantees and political pacts failed to achieve standard levels of 
significance.418 While employing a different operationalisation for peace, her argument for 
employing the variables is also based on transforming the context of the transitional 
period.419 Other authors have also found that outside actors cannot exert influence on the 
implementation and conduct of inclusive political institutions.420   
For the sake of parsimony, the concept of the model introduced in this paper is very 
simplistic. Both the case of Djibouti (with the heavy presence of French and American 
troops) and the case of the private military company Executive Outcomes (EO) in Sierra 
Leone show that my analysis with regards to the security context of my cases would have 
benefitted from an approach which recognises that there is a variety of actors which play 
a role in post-conflict situations, not only the national government, rebels and 
international peace operations. Particularly the lack of inclusion of non-state agents within 
much of the realist and constructivist analyses in conflict studies has previously been 
pointed out elsewhere, but has so far not been addressed.421 Nevertheless, my anaylsis 
helped to show the relevance of these actors as antecedent conditions. Furthermore, as 
Van Evera rightly states “a theory gains prescriptive richness by pointing to manipulable 
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causes.”422 In that sense the empirical analysis of Sierra Leone benefitted from an 
additional insight, pointing to the malleable impact of the withdrawal of EO. 
My question was guided by the increasing attention post-conflict elections have been 
receiving, from academics and policy makers alike. While I maintain that dependent on 
the context in which post-conflict elections are held, there is a significant danger of the 
process accelerating the breakdown of peace, there is an exaggerated focus on the 
election itself. One needs to wonder, whether the demands of national governments and 
development agencies has in part inspired this focus from the epistemic community423, 
since security around an election is achieved more easily than for the whole ‘transitional 
phase’.424  
The case of Djibouti furthermore highlights that an additional measure would have proved 
useful, namely state capacity for repression. While all of the cases discussed are post-
conflict countries which are somewhat autocratic in nature (by inference from the fact 
that they are not democratic, as indicated by my CV2), case evidence from Djibouti leads 
me to suggest that the capacities for repression still varied. Capacity for repression is in 
the literature on social movements regarded as one of the most important conditions for 
mobilisation, and as such important for the organisation of rebel movements and conflict 
recurrence.425 One measure to consider could have been the Political Terror Scale (PTS), 
which focuses on state behaviour with regards to the intensity, scope and range of 
violence used against non-state actors.426 This leads me to my next point, the important 
distinction between ‘war termination’ and ‘democratisation’.  
At the start of this paper I pointed out that we have to make a distinction between the 
‘success’ of an election in war termination and democratisation (Chapter 1.3). It appears 
that particularly Djibouti highlights this distinction: the election functioned as ‘a 
confirmation for war-termination’, but only because the regime is decisively undemocratic 
and repressive. Hence, further research should focus on the question of whether the 
same conditions that enable the holding of elections for war termination also set the 
conditions for long-term democratisation. This appears to be of particular relevance 
considering that both of my explanatory variables are not suitable for the long-term. In 
the majority of cases power-sharing is not practiced after an election (Chapter 6.3). 
422 Van Evera (1997): p.21. 
423 For the relationship between knowledge bodies, i.e. epistemic communities and international policy refer to 
Haas (1992).  
424 Fischer (2002) also makes a point on the interest of practitioners on a narrow concept of security. 
425 For a review of the literature on social movements refer to McAdam et al. (1996).  
426 For more information on the PTS (www.politicalterrorscale.org), refer to Wood and Gibney (2010).  
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Furthermore, peace operations cannot, and indeed do not, stay forever in a country. As 
mentioned for the case of Liberia, the pull-out of a peace operation that has been on the 
ground for the past decade is always a source of renewed concern. What we hence need 
is research into long-term measures which can help post-war societies to overcome the 
‘conflict trap’ and forge peace that is more than the absence of violence.427 
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Laura Wolfs: Democrazy?!    81 
Bibliography 
Abdallah, Abdo (2007): “State Building, Independence And Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Djibouti”, in: 
Dahre, Ulf Johansson (ed): Post-Conflict Peace-Building in the Horn of Africa, Lund: Lunds Universitet 
Sweden, pp.177-188.  
 
Abidjan Peace Agreement, November 30 1996.  
 
Abraham, Arthur (2009): “The Quest for Peace in Sierra Leone”, in: Olonisakin, Funmi (ed): Engaging 
Sierra Leone: Roundtable on Reconciliation and State-Building, London: Centre for Democracy and 
Development. 
 
Abraham, Arthur (2004): “State Complicity as a Factor in Perpetuating the Sierra Leone Civil War”, in: 
Abdullah, Ibrahim (ed): Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War, Dakar: Council for the 
Development of Social Science Research in Africa, pp. 
 
Accord (2000) “Paying the price: The Sierra Leone peace process“, Concilliation Resources, No. 9, www.c-
r.org/accord-article/profiles-accord-sierra-leone, last accessed 10.01.2013.  
 
African Elections Database, A database of election results in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
http://africanelections.tripod.com/, last accessed 05.02.2013.  
 
Agreement for Reform and Civil Concord, May 12 2001.  
 
Accra Peace Accord, August 18 2003.  
 
Allen, Christopher (1968): “Sierra Leone Politics Since Independence”, African Affairs, Vol. 67 (269), pp. 
305-329.   
 
Bah, Sarjoh and Jones, Bruce (2008): Peace Operations Partnerships: Lessons and Issues from 
Coordination to Hybrid Arrangements, New York University: Center on International Cooperation. 
 
Bangura, Yusuf (1997): "Reflections on the Sierra Leone Peace Accord", African Journal of International 
Affairs, Vol. 1 (1), pp.57-78., p.61.  
 
Bassiouni, Cherif (2011): Crimes Against Humanity: Historical Evolution and Contemporary Application, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (2004): “Former Burundi rebels say to continue boycott of government, 
National Assembly”. Retrieved via LexisNexis on 16.01.2013.  
 
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (2004): “Burundi: Former rebel group changes name, transforms into 
political party”. Retrieved via LexisNexis on 16.01.2013. 
 
Bellamy, Alex and Williams, Paul (2005): “Who is keeping the peace? Regionalization and Contemporary 
Peace Operations”, International Security, Vol. 29 (4), pp. 157–195.  
 
Bellamy, Alex; Williams, Paul and Griffin, Stuart (2010): Understanding Peacekeeping, Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
 
Bennett, Andrew (2004): “Case Study Methods: Design, Use, and Comparative Advantage”, in: Sprinz, 
Detlef and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias (ed): Models, Numbers and Cases. Methods for Studying International 
Relations, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, pp. 19-55. 
 
                                                                          Laura Wolfs: Democrazy?! 
 
82 
Bennis, Phylis (1996): Calling the Shots: How Washington Dominates Today’s UN. New York: Olive Branch 
Press.  
 
Bertelsmann Transformation Index (2010): “Country Profile Burundi”, http://www.bti2010.bertelsmann-
transformation-index.de/en/bti/country-reports/laendergutachten/eastern-and-southern-africa/burundi/, 
last accessed 10.01.2013.  
 
Binningsbø, Helga Malmin and the International Peace Research Institute (2005): “Consociational 
Democracy and Postconflict Peace. Will Power-Sharing Institutions Increase the Probability of Lasting Peace 
after Civil War?”, Oslo: Centre for the Study of Civil War. 
 
Blattman, Christopher and Miguel, Edward (2010): “Civil War”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 48 (1), 
3–57. 
 
Bøås, Morten (2010): “Milita Formation and the ‘Nationalisation’ of Violent Conflict in Liberia”, in: Mulaj, 
Kledja (ed): Violent Non-State Actors in World Politics, Columbia University Press.  
 
Bollee, Amedee (2003): “Djibouti: From French Outpost to US Base”, Review of African Political Economy, 
Vol. 30 (97), pp.481-484.  
 
Brass, Jennifer (2008): “Djibouti’s unusual resource curse”, Journal of Modern African Studies, 46(4), 
pp.523-545.  
 
Call, Charles (2012): Why Peace Fails: The Causes and Prevention of Civil War Recurrence, Washington: 
Georgetown University Press.  
 
Cammett, Melani and Malesky, Edmund (2012): “Powersharing in Post Conflict Societies: Implications for 
Peace and Governance”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 2012 56 (6), pp. 982- 1016. 
 
Collier, Paul (2009): Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places, New York: Harper Collins. 
 
Collier, Paul (2007): The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done 
About It, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke and Sambanis, Nicholas (2005): “The Collier-Hoeffler Model of Civil War Onset 
and the Case Study Project Research Design”, in: Collier and Sambanis (ed): Understanding Civil War: 
Evidence and Anlaysis, Washington: The World Bank, pp. 1-34.  
 
Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke (2005): “Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict”, The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Vol. 49 (4), pp. 625-633.  
 
Collier, Paul (2003): Breaking the Conflict Trap, Washington: World Bank.  
 
Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke and Söderbom, Mans (2001): On the Duration of Civil War, Irvine: University of 
California. 
 
Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke (1998): “On the economic causes of civil war”, Oxford Economic Papers, 
Vol. 50 (4), pp.563-573.   
 
Curtis, Devon (2007): “Transitional Governance in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo” in: 
Guttieri, Karen and Piombo, Jessica (ed.) Interim Governments: Institutional Bridges to Democracy and 
Peace?, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, pp.171-194.  
 
Daley, Patricia (2007): “The Burundi Peace Negotiations: An African Experience of Peace-Making“, Review 
of African Political Economy, No.111, pp.333-353. 
 
Daley, Patricia (2006): “Ethnicity and Political Violence in Africa: The Challenge to the Burundi State”, 
Laura Wolfs: Democrazy?!    83 
Political Geography, Vol. 25 (6), pp.657-679.   
 
Department of Political Science, University of Catania (Italy), Dataset of 205 multilateral peace operations 
(1947 - 2008 ), “Codebook Version 2.2008”, http://www.fscpo.unict.it/adism/adism_file/Page344.htm, last 
accessed 05.02.2013.  
 
De Soysa, Indra and Neumayer, Eric (2007): “Resource Wealth and the Risk of Civil War Onset”, Conflict 
Management and Peace Science, Vol. 24 (3), pp.201–218. 
 
Di Palma, Guiseppe (1990): To Craft Democracy, Berkeley: University of California Press.  
 
Diamond, Larry (1996): “Three Paradoxes of Democracy” in: Diamond, Larry and Plattner, Marc (ed) The 
Global Resurgence of Democracy, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, pp. 111-123.  
 
Doyle, Michael (1986): “Liberalism and World Politics”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 80 (4), pp. 
1151-1169. 
 
Dupuy, Kendra and Binningsbø, Helga (2007): Power-Sharing and Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone, Oslo: 
Centre for the Study of Civil War. 
 
Dupuy, Kendra and Detzel, Julian (2007): “Power-sharing and Peace-building in Liberia”, Centre for the 
Study of Civil War. 
 
Ellingsen,Tanja (2000): “Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches' Brew? Multiethnicity and Domestic Conflict 
during and after the Cold War”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 44, No. 2, pp. 228-249. 
 
European Commission (n.d.): “The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”,  
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/fyrom/index_en.htm, last 
accessed 25.01.2013.  
 
Falch, Ashild; Becker, Megan (2007): “Power-Sharing and Peacebuilding in Burundi“, Oslo: Centre for the 
Study of Civil War. 
 
Fearon, James (1995): “Rationalist Explanations for War”, International Organization, Vol. 49 (3), pp. 379-
414. 
 
Fischer, Jeff (2002): “Electoral Conflict and Violence - A Strategy for Study and Prevention”, IFES White 
Paper.  
 
Flores, Thomas and Nooruddin, Irfan (2012): “The Effect of Elections on Postconflict Peace and 
Reconstruction”, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 74 (2), pp. 558–570. 
 
Fortna, Virgina (2008): Does peacekeeping work? Shaping belligerents' choices after civil war. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.   
 
Fortna, Virgina (2004): “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace?”, International Studies Quarterly, Volume (2), pp. 
269-292. 
 
Fortna, Virginia (2004): Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the durability of Peace, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.  
 
Harispe, Francois-Xavier (1996): “Polls close in Sierra Leone after at least 27 killed in related violence”, 
Agence France Presse, 27 February 1996, retrieved via LexisNexis on 14.01.2013.  
 
Garber, Larry (1998): “Introduction” in: Kumar, Krishna (ed) Postconflict Elections, Democratisation and 
International Assistance, London: Lynne Rienner Pub, pp. 1-4.  
 
                                                                          Laura Wolfs: Democrazy?! 
 
84 
Geddes, Barbara (1990): “How the cases you chose affect the answers you get: Selection Bias in 
Comparative Politics.”, Political Analysis, 2 (1), p.131-150. 
 
Gerring, John (2012): Social Science Methodology: A Unified Framework, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.  
 
Gilligan and Stedman (2003) “Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?”, International Studies Review, Vol. 5(4), 
pp-37-54. 
 
Gleditsch, Kristian and Ruggeri, Andrea (2007): “Political opportunity structures, democracy, and civil war”, 
Paper prepared for presentation at the 6th SGIR Pan-European International Relations Conference, Turin.  
 
Gleditsch, Kristian (2002): All International Politics is Local: The Diffusion of Conflict, Integration and 
Democratization, University of Michigan Press.  
 
Grimm, Sonja (2010): Erzwungene Demokratie Politische Neuordnung nach militärischer Intervention unter 
externer Aufsicht, Nomos Verlag. 
 
GTZ (2001) Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in Post-war and Transition Countries 
Trends and Challenges of External Support Division 43 Health, Education, Nutrition and Emergency Aid 
 
Gurr, Tedd Robert (1970): Why men rebel, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Guttieri, Karen and Piombo, Jessica (2007): “Issues and Debates in Transitional Rule”, in: Guttieri and 
Piombo (ed): Interim Governments: Institutional Bridges to Peace and Democracy?, pp.3-34. 
 
Haas, Peter (1992), “Introduction: epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination”, 
International Organization, Vol.46 (1), pp.1-35. 
 
Harispe, Francois-Xavier (1996): “Polls close in Sierra Leone after at least 27 killed in related violence”, 
Agence France Presse, 27 February 1996, retrieved via LexisNexis on 14.01.2013.  
 
Harris, David (2006) “Liberia 2005: an unusual post-conflict election”, Journal of Modern African Studies, 44 
(3), p. 377 and 393 
 
Hartzell, Caroline and Hoddie, Matthew (2007): Crafting Peace: Power-sharing Institutions and the 
Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press. 
 
Hartzell, Caroline and Hoddie, Matthew (2005a): “Powersharing in Peace Settlements: Initiating the 
Transition from Civil War”, in: Roeder,Philip (ed): Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy After Civil War, 
London: Cornell University Press, pp. 83-106.   
 
Hartzell, Caroline and Hoddie, Matthew (2005b): “Signals of Reconciliation: Institution-Building and the 
Resolution of Civil Wars”, Intemational Studies Review, Vol. 7, pp. 21-40.  
 
Hartzell, Caroline and Hoddie, Matthew (2003): “Institutionalising Peace: Power sharing and Post Civil War 
Conflict Management”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 47, pp.318-332. 
 
Hartzell, Caroline; Hoddie, Matthew and Rothchild, Donald (2001): “Stabilising peace after war. Some key 
variables”, International Organization, Vol. 55 (1), pp. 183-208.  
 
Heldt, Birgit and Wallensteen, Peter (2006): Peacekeeping Operations: Global Patterns of Intervention and 
Success, 1948–2004, Folke Bernadotte Publications. 
 
Hintjens, Helen (1999): “Explaining the 1999 genocide in Rwanda”, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 
Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 241-286. 
 
Laura Wolfs: Democrazy?!    85 
Hirsch, John (2001): Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy, Lynne Riener Publishers. 
 
Höglund, Kristine; Jarstad, Ana and Kovacs, Mimmi (2009): “The Predicament of Elections in War-Torn 
Societies”, Democratization, Vol. 16 (3), pp. 530-557. 
 
Holmqvist, Göran (2012): “Inequality and Identity – Causes of War?”, Discussion Paper 72, Uppsala: 
Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, p. 15 
 
Hough, Leslie (2007): “A study of peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and private military companies in 
Sierra Leone”, African Security Review, Vol. 16 (4), pp.8-21. 
 
Horowitz, Donald (2000): “Constitutional Design: An Oxymoron?” in: Shapiro, Ian (ed) Designing 
Democratic Institutions, New York: New York University Press, pp. 253-284. 
 
Horowitz, Donald (1985): Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Howe, Robert (2001): “Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping”, in: Brown, Michael (ed): 
Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict, MIT Press. 
 
Human Rights Watch (2012): “Angola’s upcoming election”, www.hrw.org/reports/2012/08/01/angola-s-
upcoming-elections, last accessed 01.02.2013.  
 
Hyde, Susan and Marinov, Nikolay (2012): “Which Elections Can Be Lost?”, Political Analysis, Volume 20 
(2), pp.191-210. 
 
International Crisis Group (2011): “Côte d’Ivoire: Is War the Only Option?”, Africa Report No. 171.  
 
International Crisis Group (2004): “Rebuilding Liberia: Prospects and Perils”, Africa Report No. 75.  
 
IRI/IFES (2005): “Djibouti: 2005 Pre-Election Assessment Report”, International Republican Institute and 
International Foundation For Electoral Systems and International Foundation for Electoral System. 
 
Jackson, Stephen (2007): “The United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) – Political and Strategic 
Lessons Learned”, Independent External Study, New York: Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum. 
 
Jakobsen, Peter (1996): “National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UN Peace Enforcement 
after the Cold War?”,  Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 33, pp. 205-215. 
 
Jarstad, Ana (2009): “The Prevalence of Power-Sharing: Exploring the Patterns of Post-Election Peace”, 
Africa Spectrum, Vol. 44 (3), pp. 41-62.  
 
Jarstad, Ana (2008): “Post-Accord Elections, Power Sharing and Conflict”, Department of Peace and Conflict 
Research, Uppsala University. 
 
Joshi, Madhav and Darby, John (2012): Introducing the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM): A Database of 
Comprehensive Peace Agreements and their Implementation, 1989-2006, University of Notre Dame: Kroc 
Institute for International Peace Studies. 
 
Jung, Jai Kwan (2012): “Power-sharing and democracy promotion in post-civil war peace-building”, 
Democratization, Vol. 19 (3), pp.486-506. 
 
Kadamy, Mohamed (1996): “Djibouti: Between War and Peace”, Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 
23 (70), pp.511-521. 
 
Kaldor, Mary and Vincent, James (2006): “Evaluation of UNDP Assistance to Conflict-Affected Countries: 
Case Study Sierra Leone”, United Nations Development Programme Evaluation Office. 
 
  Laura Wolfs: Democrazy?! 86 
Kandeh, Jimmy (2004): “In Search of Legitimacy: The 1996 Elections”, in: Abdullah, Ibrahim (ed): Between 
Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War, Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science 
Research in Africa, pp. 123-143.  
Kandeh, Jimmy (1998): „Transition without Rupture: Sierra Leone's Transfer Election of 1996”,  African 
Studies Review, Vol. 41 (2), pp. 91-111. 
Kandeh, Jimmy (1992): “Politicization of Ethnic Identities in Sierra Leone”, African Studies Review, Vol. 35 
(1), pp.81-93.  
Kaplan, Robert (1997): “Was democracy just a moment?”, The Atlantic, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1997/12/was-democracy-just-a-moment/306022/, last 
accessed 15.01.2013.  
Kaplan, Robert (2003): “Was democracy just a moment?”, The Atlantic, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1997/12/was-democracy-just-a-moment/306022/, last 
accessed 20.01.2013.  
Keen, David (2012): “Greed and Grievance in Civil War”, International Affairs, Vol. 88 (4), pp.757–777; 
Khosla, Deepa (2004): Third Party Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts: A Force for Peace or Spiraling Violence, 
University of Maryland. 
Kühne, Winrich (2010): “The Role of Elections in Emerging Democracies and Postconflict Countries”, 
International Policy Analysis, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 
Lacina, Bethany and Gleditsch, Nils Petter (2005) “Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of 
Battle Deaths", European Journal of Population, Vol. 21, pp.145 -166. 
Lemarchand, René (2006): “Consociationalism and Power-sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, and The 
Democratic Republic of the Congo”, African Affairs, Vol.106 (422), p.1-20. 
Leonard, David (2011): „Elections and Conflict Resolution in Africa“, in: Matlosa, Khadiagala, Shale (ed): 
When Elephants Fight: Preventing and Resolving Election-Related Conflicts in Africa, Electoral Institute of 
Southern Africa, pp. 37-50.  
Licklider, Roy (1993): “How Civil Wars End: Questions and Methods”, in: Licklider, Roy (ed): Stopping the 
Killing, New York: New York University Press, pp. 3-19.  
Lijphart, Arend (1977): Democracy in Plural Societies: a comparative exploration, New Haven: Yale 
University Press.  
Lijphart, Arend (1971): “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method", The American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 65(3), pp. 682-93. 
Lindberg, Staffan (2009): Democratization by Elections: A new mode of transition, Baltimore: The John 
Hopkins University Press.  
Lusaka Protocol 1994, October 31 1994. 
Lyons, Terrence (1998): “Peace and Elections in Liberia”, in Kumar, Krishna (ed): Postconflict elections, 
Democratisation and International Assistance, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp.177-194.  
Lyons, Terrence (2002): “Postconflict Elections: War Termination, Democratisation, and Demilitarizing 
Politics”, Working Paper No.20, George Mason University: Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution. 
Laura Wolfs: Democrazy?!    87 
Malan, Mark; Rakate, Phenyo and McIntyre, Angela (2002): “Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone – UNAMSIL hits 
the Home Straight”, International Security Studies, Monograph No.68.  
 
McAdam et al. (1996): Comparative Perspective on Social Movements, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.  
 
Mansfield, Edward and Snyder, Jack (1995): “Democratisation and War”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74 (3), pp.79-
97. 
 
Marshall, Monty and Jaggers, Keith (2010a): Polity IV Country Report 2010: Djibouti, 
systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm, last accessed 05.02.2013.  
 
Marshall, Monty and Jaggers, Keith (2010b): Polity IV Country Report 2010: Burundi, 
systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm, last accessed 05.02.2013.  
 
Mason et al (2011): “When Civil Wars Recur: Conditions for Durable Peace after Civil Wars”, International 
Studies Perspectives, Vol.12, pp.171-189.  
 
Ministère de la Défense (2012): “Les forces françaises stationnées à Djibouti”, 
http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/forces-prepositionnees/djibouti/dossier/les-forces-francaises-stationnees-
a-djibouti, last accessed 10.12.2012.  
 
Morgan, Philip (2007): “Interim Government in Liberia – Peace Building Toward the Status Quo”, in: 
Guttieri and Piombo (ed): Interim Governments: Institutional Bridges to Peace and Democracy, 
Washington: United States Institute for Peace Press, pp. 195-216. 
 
Munck, Gerardo (2004): “Tools for qualitative research” in Brady, Henry and Collier, David (ed) Rethinking 
Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, pp.105-122.  
 
Nilsson, Desirée and Kovacs, Mimmi (2005): “Breaking the Cycle of Violence? Promises and Pitfalls of the 
Liberian Peace Process”, Civil Wars 7(4), pp.598-623. 
 
Nindorera, Willy (2012): “The CNDD-FDD in Burundi: The path from armed to political struggle”, Berghof 
Transitions Series No.10, Berlin: Berghof Foundation. 
 
Norris, Pippa (2005): “Stable democracy and good governance in divided societies: Do power-sharing 
institutions work?”Paper for presentation at the International Studies Association 46th annual convention, 
Panel SC04 Political Institutions and Ethnic Politics, 1.45-3.30 on Saturday 5th March 2005, Honolulu. 
 
North, Douglas (1990): Institutions, institutional change and economic performance, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
OECD (2011): From Power Struggles to Sustainable Peace: Understanding Political Settlements, 
http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/development/from-power-struggles-to-
sustainable-peace_9789264116498-en, last accessed 20.11.2012.  
 
Ottaway, Marina (1998): “Angola’s Failed Elections”, in: Kumar, Krishna (ed) Postconflict Elections, 
Democratization and International Assistance, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp.133-152.  
 
Oudraat, Chantal De Jonge (1996): “The United Nations and Internal Conflict” in: Brown, Michael (ed) 
International Dimensions of Internal Conflicts, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 489-536. 
 
Paris, Roland (2005): At War’s End, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Paye-Layleh, Jonathan (2005): “George Weah drops legal challenge against Liberian election results”, 
Associated Press, retrieved via LexisNexis on 26.12.2012. 
 
                                                                          Laura Wolfs: Democrazy?! 
 
88 
Peace Accords Matrix <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/matrix/status/14/electoral_political_reform>, Kroc 
Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, last accessed 11.01.2013.  
 
Peace Accords Matrix, Pretoria Protocol- Powersharing- Transitional Government, 
https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/matrix/status/45/powersharing_transitional_government, Kroc Institute for 
International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame. Last accessed 15.01.2013.  
 
Peter, Guy (1998): Comparative Politics: Theory and Methods, New York: New York University Press.   
 
Petruseva, Ana (2002): “Elections Huge Victory For Macedonia”, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 
BCR Issue 38, http://iwpr.net/report-news/elections-huge-victory-macedonia, last accessed 25.01.2013. 
 
Ploch, Lauren (2011): “Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa”, 
Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34003.pdf, last access 12.12.2012.  
 
Polity IV Index, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm, last accessed 05.02.2013.  
 
Prendergast, John (1999): “Building for Peace in the Horn of Africa: Diplomacy and Beyond,” United States 
Institute of Peace Special Report. 
 
Pretoria Protocol on Outstanding Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing Issues in Burundi, 
November 2 2003.  
 
Pridham, Geoffrey (2000): “Actors, Linkages and Democratisation”, in The Dynamics of Democratisation: A 
Comparative Approach, London: Continuum, pp.136-177.  
 
Regan, Patrick and Norton, Daniel (2005): “Greed, Grievance, and Mobilization in Civil Wars”, Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, Vol. 49, pp. 319-336.  
 
Reilly, Benjamin (2008): “Post-Conflict Elections: Uncertain Turning Points of Transition”, in Jarstad, Ana 
and Sisk, Timothy (ed): From War-to-Democracy Transitions: Dilemmas of Democratisation and 
Peacebuilding in War-Torn Societies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press ,pp. 
 
Reyntjens, Filip (2000): Burundi: Prospects for Peace, Minority Rights Group International.  
 
Rodt, Annemarie (2011): “The African Mission in Burundi”, Ethnopolitics Papers, No.10, Exeter Centre for 
Ethno-Political Studies.  
 
Roeder, Philip and Rothchild, Donald (2005a) “Power-sharing as an Impediment to Peace and Democracy“, 
in: Rothchild and Roeder (ed): Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy After War, London. Cornell 
University Press, pp.29-51.  
 
Roeder, Philip and Rothchild, Donald (2005b): “Conclusion. Nation-State Stewardship and the Alternatives 
to Power-sharing”, in: Roeder and Rothchild (ed): Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy After War, 
London. Cornell University Press, pp.319-346.  
 
Rummel, Rudolph (1995): “Democracy, Power, Genocide, and Mass Murder”, The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Mar., 1995), pp. 3-26. 
 
Rummel, Rudolph (1997): “Is Collective Violence Correlated with Social Pluralism?”, Journal of Peace 
Research, Vol. 34, No. 2 , pp. 163-175. 
 
Sambanis, Nicholas (2003): Using Case Study to Explain Civil War, CPR Working Papers No.3.  
 
Sambanis, Nicholas (2002): “A Review of Recent Advances and Future Directions in the Quantitative 
Literature on Civil War”, Defence and Peace Economics, Vol. 13 (3), pp. 215-243. 
Laura Wolfs: Democrazy?!    89 
 
Sayle et.al (2009): Liberia: Assessing the Conditions for Liberal Democracy in a Postconflict State, The 
Centre for the Study of Democracy, Ontario: School of Policy Studies at Queen’s University.  
 
Schneckener, Ulrich (2009), “Spoilers or Governance Actors? - Engaging Armed Non-State Groups in Areas 
of Limited Statehood”, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 21, Berlin: Research Center (SFB) 700. 
 
Serwer, Daniel (2007): “Conclusions and Policy Implications: Yes, It Makes A Difference”, in: Guttieri and 
Piombo (ed): Interim Governments: Institutional Bridges to Peace and Democracy, pp.347-354.  
 
Shain, Yossi and Linz, Juan (1995): Between States, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Simons, Claudia and Zanker, Franzisca (2012): “Finding the Cases that Fit: Methodological Challenges in 
Peace Research”, GIGA Working Papers 189.  
 
Sisk, Timothy (2008): “Elections in Fragile States: Between Voice and Violence”, Paper Prepared for The 
International Studies Association Annual Meeting San Francisco, California. 
 
Snyder, Jack (2000): From Voting to Violence, New York: Norton 
 
Snyder, Jack and Brancati, Dawn (2011a): Rushing to the Polls: The Causes of Premature Postconflict 
Elections”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 55 (3), pp. 469-492. 
 
Snyder, Jack and Brancati, Dawn (2011b): Time to Kill: The Impact of Election Timing on Post-Conflict 
Stability, brancati.wustl.edu/T2K_Feb62011.pdf, last accessed 05.02.2013.   
 
Spears, Ian (2002): “Africa: The Limits of Power-Sharing”, Journal of Democracy Vol. 13 (3), pp. 123-136.   
 
Sririam, Chandra (2008): Peace as Governance: Power-Sharing, Armed Groups and Contemporary Peace 
Negotiations, Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
Stedman, John (1997): “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes”, International Security, Vol. 22 (2), pp. 5-53. 
 
Stedman, John (1996), “International Implementation of Peace Agreements in Civil Wars”, in: Crocker (ed): 
Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, Washington: United States Institute of 
Peace, pp.737-752 
 
Stedman, Stephen (1996): "Negotiation and Mediation in Internal Conflicts," in Brown, Michael (ed) The 
International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, pp. 369- 371 
 
Stewart, Frances (2004): “Development and security”, Conflict, Security & Development, Vol. 4 (3), 261-
288.  
 
Sullivan, Daniel (2005): “The missing pillars. A look at the failure of peace in Burundi through the lens of 
Arend Lijphart’s theory of consociational democracy”, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 43 (1), pp.75-
95.  
 
Swarbrick, Peter (2007): “Avoiding Disarmament Failure: The Critical Link in DDR”, Small Arms Survey, 
Geneva: Graduate Institute of International Studies. 
 
Themnér, Lotta and Wallensteen, Peter (2012): “Armed Conflict, 1946-2011”, Journal of Peace Research, 
Vol. 49 (4). 
 
Thibaut, Bernad (1999): “Djibouti” in Nohlen, Dieter and Thibaut, Bernard (ed) Elections in Africa: A Data 
Handbook, Oxford University Press.  
 
Traniello, Marisa (2008): “Power-Sharing: Lessons from South Africa and Rwanda”, International Public 
  Laura Wolfs: Democrazy?! 90 
Policy Review, Vol. 3 (2), pp.28-43. 
Tull, Denis and Mehler, Andreas (2005): “The hidden cost of power-sharing: reproducing insurgent violence 
in Africa”, African Affairs, Vol. 104 (416), pp.375-398.  
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (n.d.): “What is peacekeeping?“ 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peacekeeping.shtml, last accessed 15.11.12. 
United Nations (2012): Security Council commits to ‘effective steps’ to enhance relationship with African 
Union in conflict prevention, resolution, with unanimous adoption of 2033. UN document S/RES/2033.  
United Nations (2005a): Special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in 
Burundi. UN document S/2005/586. 
United Nations (2005b): Third report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Burundi. 
UN document S/2005/149.  
United Nations (2005c) “In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all”, 
Report of the Secretary-General, UN document A/59/2005. 
United Nations (2003a): Letter dated 29 July 2003 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President 
of the Security Council, UN document S/2003/769.  
United Nations (2003b): Security Council Resolution 1509, Adopted by the Security Council at its 4830th 
meeting, UN document S/RES/1509.  
United Nations (2001): Report of the Secretary-General on “No Exit Without Strategy: Security Council 
decision-making and the closure or transition of United Nations peacekeeping operations”. UN document 
S/2001/394.  
United Nations (1999): “Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during 
the 1994 genocide in Rwanda”, http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/1967799.36552048.html, last accessed 
05.02.2013. 
United Nations (1992): An Agenda for Peace Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. UN 
document A/47/277 - S/24111. 
UNMIL Facts and Figures, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmil/facts.shtml, last accessed 
26.12.2012. 
US Energy Information Administration <http://www.eia.gov/countries/data.cfm>, last accessed 28.11.2012 
Vandeginste, Stef (2009): “Power-Sharing, Conflict and Transition in Burundi: Twenty Years of Trial and 
Error, Africa Spectrum, Vol. 44 (3), pp.63-86.   
Vanderzee, Leonore; Taylor, Laura; Dukalskis, Alexis; Gottlieb-McHale, Alma and Sullivan, Chris (2010): 
„Comprehensive Peace Agreement: How is it Defined and Why Does It Matter?”, Peace Accords Matrix, 
www.peaceaccords.org, last accessed 29.11.2012. 
Varieties of Democracy April 2012 Codebook <https://v-dem.net/faq/Codebook22APRIL2012.pdf>. Last 
accessed 15.11.2012. 
Wallensteen, Peter (2012): Understanding Conflict Resolution, London: Sage Publications. 
Walter, Barbara (2002): Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.  
Laura Wolfs: Democrazy?! 91
Walter, Barbara (2004): “Does Conflict Beget Conflict? – Explaining Recurring Civil War”, Journal of Peace 
Research, Vol. 41 (3), pp.371-388. 
Wolff, Stefan (2011): A Consociational Theory of Conflict Management, Department of Political Science and 
International Studies University of Birmingham. 
Wolff, Stefan (2008): Resolving Self-determination Conflicts: The emerging practice of complex power-
sharing, http://www.stefanwolff.com/research/the-emerging-practice-of-complex-power-sharing, last 
accessed 05.02.2013. 
Wood, Reed and Gibney, Mark (2010): “The political Terror Scale (PTS): A Re-Introduction and a 
Comparison to CIRI”, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 32 (2), pp.367-400.  
World Bank (n.d.): Data: Countries according to income classifications, 
http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications, last accessed 10.01.2013. 
World Bank (2011): Conflict, Security and Development, Washington: The International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank. 
Zartman, I. William (2001): “The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments”, 
Global Review of Ethnopolitics, Vol. 1 (1), p. 8-19.  
Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze (2012): “Peace Operations 2025“, http://www.zif-
berlin.org/de/analyse-und-informationen/veroeffentlichungen/weitere-zif-publikationen.html, last accessed 
16.11.12. 
de Zeeuw, Jeroen and Curtis Devon (2010): Rebel Movements and Political Party Development in Post-
Conflict Societies – A Short Literature Review, New York: Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies. 
